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THE ETHICS OF BELIEF
SPRING 2015
Meets Wednesdays in 27/2003 from 9-10
and Thursdays in 65/1097 from 12-2
SCHEDULE OF READINGS
For each week, the readings divide into required and optional
further readings. I include the optional readings just in case you
find the topic especially interesting and would like to write a paper
on it or simply learn more. You are not at all expected to read them.
Part 1: Evidentialism and Pragmatic Reasons for Belief
Week 1 – The Original Evidentialism/Pragmatism Debate
Required
Clifford, W. K. “The Ethics of Belief”
James, W. “The Will to Believe”
Optional Further Reading
Chignell, A. “The Ethics of Belief” SEP
Marusic, B. “The Ethics of Belief”
Feldman, R. “Clifford’s Principle and James’s Options”
Gale, R. “William James and the Willfulness of Belief”
Haack, S. “The Ethics of Belief Reconsidered”
Mitova, V. “Why W. K. Clifford Was a Closet Pragmatist”
Pace, M. “The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations...and James’s ‘Will to Believe’”
Week 2 – Contemporary Evidentialism and the Right Kind of Reason
Required
Shah, N. “A New Argument for Evidentialism”
Hieronymi, P. “The Wrong Kind of Reason”
Optional Further Reading
Leary, S. “In Defense of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief”
McHugh, C. “The Illusion of Exclusivity” NET
Parfit, D. “State-Given Reasons”
Reisner, A. “The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem”
Schroeder, M. “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons”
Steglich-Petersen, A. “Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism?”
Whiting, D. “Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action” NET
Week 3 – Pragmatic Encroachment
Required
Hawthorne, J. and Stanley, J. “Knowledge and Action”
Lackey, J. “Acting on Knowledge”
Brown, J. “Practical Reasoning, Decision Theory, and Anti-Intellectualism”
Optional Further Reading
Brown, J. “Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem”
Brown, J. “Knowledge and Practical Reason”
Brown, J. “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning”
Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification”
Hawthorne, J. Knowledge and Lotteries
Schroeder, M. “Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge”
Stanley, J. Knowledge and Practical Interests
Week 4 – The Ethics of Religious Belief
Required
Buchak, L. “Can It Be Rational to Have Faith?” NET
Smith, M. “The Epistemology of Religion”
Optional Further Reading
Smith, M. “God and the External World”
Alston, W. P. “Religious Experience and Religious Belief”
Avnur, Y. “In Defense of Secular Belief” NET
DeRose, K. “Voodoo Epistemology” NET
Plantinga, A. "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?"
Plantinga, A. “Reason and Belief in God”
Part 2: Belief and the Will
Week 5 – Doxastic Voluntarism and Involuntarism
Required
Alston, W. “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification”
Hieronymi, P. “Controlling Attitudes”
Optional Further Reading
Bennett, J. “Why Is Belief Involuntary?”
Feldman, R. “The Ethics of Belief”
Heil, J. “Doxastic Agency”
Price, H. H. “Belief and Will”
Scott-Kakures, D. "On Belief and the Captivity of the Will"
Shah, N. “Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism”
Williams, B. “Deciding to Believe”
Winters, B. "Believing at Will"
Week 6 – Doxastic Compatibilism
Required
Ryan, S. “Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief”
Hieronymi, P. “Responsibility for Believing”
Optional Further Reading
Booth, A. “On Some Recent Moves in Defence of Doxastic Compatibilism”
McHugh, C. “Exercising Doxastic Freedom”
McHugh, C. “Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness”
Peels, R. “Against Doxastic Compatibilism”
Steup, M. “Doxastic Freedom”
Steup, M. “Belief, Voluntariness, and Intentionality”
Steup, M. “Belief, Control and Intentionality”
Week 7 – Judgment and the Will
Required
Sosa, E. “Epistemic Agency”
Toribio, J. “What We Do When We Judge”
Optional Further Reading
Boyle, M. “’Making up Your Mind’ and the Activity of Reason”
Dorsch, F. “Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency”
Engel, P. “Is Epistemic Agency Possible?”
Hieronymi, P. “Two Kinds of Agency”
McHugh, C. “Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action”
McHugh, C. “Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency”
Setiya, K. “Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts”
Part 3: Virtue Epistemology
Week 8 – Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology
Required
Sosa, E. Selections from Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge: A Virtue Epistemology
Lackey, J. “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know”
Optional Further Reading
Brogaard, B. “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?”
Greco, J. “Knowledge and Success from Ability”
Greco, J. and Turri, J. “Virtue Epistemology" SEP
Pritchard, D. “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology” NET
Pritchard, D. “Apt Performance and Epistemic Value” NET
Riggs, W. “Two Problems of Easy Credit”
Turri, J. “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved”
Week 9 – Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology
Required
Zagzebski, L. Selections from Virtues of the Mind
Optional Further Reading
Baehr, J. Selections from The Inquiring Mind
Baehr, J. “Character, Reliability, and Virtue Epistemology”
Code, L. “Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology”
Montmarquet, J. “Epistemic Virtue”
Sosa, E. Selection from Judgment and Agency
Sylvan, K. “Responsibilism out of Character”
Zagzebski, L. “From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology”
Part 4: Skepticism, Agency, and the Ethics of Belief
Week 10 – Pyrrhonian Skepticism and 'Ought' Implies 'Can'
Required
Burnyeat, M. “Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?”
Sosa, E. “Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Human Agency”
Optional Further Reading
Greco, D. “The Impossibility of Skepticism”
Perin, C. “Scepticism and Belief”
Striker, G. “Academics versus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered”
Vogt, K. “Scepticism and Action”
Part 5: The Politics of Belief
Week 11 – Epistemic Injustice
Required
Fricker, M. “Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing”
Optional Further Reading
Anderson, E. “Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions”
Coady, D. “Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice”
Fricker, M. Epistemic Injustice, Chapters 1, 3 and 4
Fricker, M. “Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology”
Goldberg, S. “Comments on Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice”
Hookway, C. “Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker”
SPRING 2015
Meets Wednesdays in 27/2003 from 9-10
and Thursdays in 65/1097 from 12-2
SCHEDULE OF READINGS
For each week, the readings divide into required and optional
further readings. I include the optional readings just in case you
find the topic especially interesting and would like to write a paper
on it or simply learn more. You are not at all expected to read them.
Part 1: Evidentialism and Pragmatic Reasons for Belief
Week 1 – The Original Evidentialism/Pragmatism Debate
Required
Clifford, W. K. “The Ethics of Belief”
James, W. “The Will to Believe”
Optional Further Reading
Chignell, A. “The Ethics of Belief” SEP
Marusic, B. “The Ethics of Belief”
Feldman, R. “Clifford’s Principle and James’s Options”
Gale, R. “William James and the Willfulness of Belief”
Haack, S. “The Ethics of Belief Reconsidered”
Mitova, V. “Why W. K. Clifford Was a Closet Pragmatist”
Pace, M. “The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations...and James’s ‘Will to Believe’”
Week 2 – Contemporary Evidentialism and the Right Kind of Reason
Required
Shah, N. “A New Argument for Evidentialism”
Hieronymi, P. “The Wrong Kind of Reason”
Optional Further Reading
Leary, S. “In Defense of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief”
McHugh, C. “The Illusion of Exclusivity” NET
Parfit, D. “State-Given Reasons”
Reisner, A. “The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem”
Schroeder, M. “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons”
Steglich-Petersen, A. “Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism?”
Whiting, D. “Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action” NET
Week 3 – Pragmatic Encroachment
Required
Hawthorne, J. and Stanley, J. “Knowledge and Action”
Lackey, J. “Acting on Knowledge”
Brown, J. “Practical Reasoning, Decision Theory, and Anti-Intellectualism”
Optional Further Reading
Brown, J. “Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem”
Brown, J. “Knowledge and Practical Reason”
Brown, J. “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning”
Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification”
Hawthorne, J. Knowledge and Lotteries
Schroeder, M. “Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge”
Stanley, J. Knowledge and Practical Interests
Week 4 – The Ethics of Religious Belief
Required
Buchak, L. “Can It Be Rational to Have Faith?” NET
Smith, M. “The Epistemology of Religion”
Optional Further Reading
Smith, M. “God and the External World”
Alston, W. P. “Religious Experience and Religious Belief”
Avnur, Y. “In Defense of Secular Belief” NET
DeRose, K. “Voodoo Epistemology” NET
Plantinga, A. "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?"
Plantinga, A. “Reason and Belief in God”
Part 2: Belief and the Will
Week 5 – Doxastic Voluntarism and Involuntarism
Required
Alston, W. “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification”
Hieronymi, P. “Controlling Attitudes”
Optional Further Reading
Bennett, J. “Why Is Belief Involuntary?”
Feldman, R. “The Ethics of Belief”
Heil, J. “Doxastic Agency”
Price, H. H. “Belief and Will”
Scott-Kakures, D. "On Belief and the Captivity of the Will"
Shah, N. “Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism”
Williams, B. “Deciding to Believe”
Winters, B. "Believing at Will"
Week 6 – Doxastic Compatibilism
Required
Ryan, S. “Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief”
Hieronymi, P. “Responsibility for Believing”
Optional Further Reading
Booth, A. “On Some Recent Moves in Defence of Doxastic Compatibilism”
McHugh, C. “Exercising Doxastic Freedom”
McHugh, C. “Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness”
Peels, R. “Against Doxastic Compatibilism”
Steup, M. “Doxastic Freedom”
Steup, M. “Belief, Voluntariness, and Intentionality”
Steup, M. “Belief, Control and Intentionality”
Week 7 – Judgment and the Will
Required
Sosa, E. “Epistemic Agency”
Toribio, J. “What We Do When We Judge”
Optional Further Reading
Boyle, M. “’Making up Your Mind’ and the Activity of Reason”
Dorsch, F. “Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency”
Engel, P. “Is Epistemic Agency Possible?”
Hieronymi, P. “Two Kinds of Agency”
McHugh, C. “Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action”
McHugh, C. “Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency”
Setiya, K. “Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts”
Part 3: Virtue Epistemology
Week 8 – Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology
Required
Sosa, E. Selections from Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge: A Virtue Epistemology
Lackey, J. “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know”
Optional Further Reading
Brogaard, B. “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?”
Greco, J. “Knowledge and Success from Ability”
Greco, J. and Turri, J. “Virtue Epistemology" SEP
Pritchard, D. “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology” NET
Pritchard, D. “Apt Performance and Epistemic Value” NET
Riggs, W. “Two Problems of Easy Credit”
Turri, J. “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved”
Week 9 – Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology
Required
Zagzebski, L. Selections from Virtues of the Mind
Optional Further Reading
Baehr, J. Selections from The Inquiring Mind
Baehr, J. “Character, Reliability, and Virtue Epistemology”
Code, L. “Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology”
Montmarquet, J. “Epistemic Virtue”
Sosa, E. Selection from Judgment and Agency
Sylvan, K. “Responsibilism out of Character”
Zagzebski, L. “From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology”
Part 4: Skepticism, Agency, and the Ethics of Belief
Week 10 – Pyrrhonian Skepticism and 'Ought' Implies 'Can'
Required
Burnyeat, M. “Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?”
Sosa, E. “Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Human Agency”
Optional Further Reading
Greco, D. “The Impossibility of Skepticism”
Perin, C. “Scepticism and Belief”
Striker, G. “Academics versus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered”
Vogt, K. “Scepticism and Action”
Part 5: The Politics of Belief
Week 11 – Epistemic Injustice
Required
Fricker, M. “Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing”
Optional Further Reading
Anderson, E. “Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions”
Coady, D. “Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice”
Fricker, M. Epistemic Injustice, Chapters 1, 3 and 4
Fricker, M. “Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology”
Goldberg, S. “Comments on Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice”
Hookway, C. “Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker”
