Epistemology

EPISTEMOLOGY
SPRING 2017

Meets Tuesdays from 2-3 in 44/1057
and Wednesdays from 9-11 in 54/5027

SCHEDULE OF READINGS

For each week, the readings mainly divide into required and
optional further readings. I include the optional readings
just in case you find the topic especially interesting and would
like to write a paper on it or simply learn more.

Note that a great many of the readings can be found online
(see links for use when connected to campus internet), and also in
Epistemology: An Anthology (eds. Sosa, Kim, Fantl and McGrath).

Part 1. Individual Epistemology

Unit A. The Analysis of Knowledge (Three Weeks)

Week 1: The Gettier Problem and Attempted Solutions in the 60s-70s

Required
Gettier, Edmund. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23: 121-123.
Zagzebski, Linda. 1994. “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.” Philosophical Quarterly 44: 65-73.

Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews
                                    Appiah, A. 2003. Thinking It Through, Chapter 2. Oxford University Press.
Fumerton, R. 2006. Epistemology, Ch. 3. Wiley-Blackwell.
Ichikawa, J. and Steup, M. 2012. “The Analysis of Knowledge.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Pritchard, D. 2006. What Is This Thing Called ‘Knowledge’?, Chs. 1 & 3. Routledge.
Sosa, E. 2017. Epistemology, Ch. 4. Princeton University Press.
                                    Zagzebski, L. 2009. Selection from On Epistemology. Wadsworth.

Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
                                    Clark, M. 1963. "Knowledge and Grounds." Analysis 24: 46-48.
                                    Goldman, A. 1967. “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Journal of Philosophy 64: 357-372.
                                    Harman, G. 1973. Selections from Thought. Princeton University Press.
Klein, P. 1976. “Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility.” Journal of Philosophy 73: 792-812.
Lehrer, K. and Paxson, T. 1969. “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.” Journal of Philosophy 66: 225-237.
Lycan, W. 2006. “The Gettier Problem Problem” in Hetherington, S. (ed.) Epistemology Futures. OUP.
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits, Introduction and Chapter 1. OUP.

Week 2: The Search for a Solution, Continued: Knowledge and Counterfactuals

Required
Comesaña, Juan. 2007. “Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals.” Philosophy Compass 2: 781-79.

                        Strongly Recommended Reading
Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations, Ch. 3, Parts I and II. Harvard University Press.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2005. Tracking Truth, Chs.1-2. Oxford University Press.
Sosa, Ernest. 1999. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 137-49.

                        Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews
Pritchard, D. 2006. What Is This Thing Called ‘Knowledge’?, Ch. 12. Routledge.
Sosa, E. 2017. Epistemology, Ch. 2. Princeton University Press.

                        Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
Briggs, R. and Nolan, D. 2012. “Mad, Bad, and Dangerous to Know.” Analysis 72: 314-316.
                                    Briggs, R. and Nolan, D. 2012. “Epistemic Dispositions.” Logos & Episteme 3: 629-636.
    Kripke, S. “Nozick on Knowledge”

Week 3: Sosa's Solution

Required Reading
Sosa, Ernest. Selections from Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1.

                        Strongly Recommended Reading
Lackey, Jennifer. 2007. “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Synthese 158: 345-361.
Sosa, E. 2017. Epistemology, Selection. Princeton University Press.

                        Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews
                                    Pritchard, D. Selections from What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?
                                    Zagzebski, L. Selection from On Epistemology.

            Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
Brogaard, B. 2006. “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?” Canadian J. Phil. 36: 335-354.
                        Greco, J. Selection from Achieving Knowledge.
Pritchard, D. 2009. “Apt Performance and Epistemic Value.” Philosophical Studies 143: 407-416.
Turri, J. 2011. “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.” Philosophers Imprint 11(8).

Unit B. The Structure of Justification (Three Weeks)

Week 4: Introduction to Foundationalism vs. Coherentism vs. Infinitism

  Required Reading
Hasan, Ali and Fumerton, Richard. 2016. “Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification” SEP.
Siegel, Susanna. 2013. “The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience.” Phil. Studies. 162: 697-722.

                        Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews
Dancy, J. Selection from Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.
   Fumerton, R. Selection from Epistemology
                                    Pritchard, D. Selection from What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?
                   Zagzebski, L. Selection from On Epistemology

                        Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
                                    Alston, W. 1976. “Two Types of Foundationalism.” Journal of Philosophy 73: 165-185.
Alston, W. 1976. “Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?" Philosophical Studies 29: 287-305.
Bergmann, M. 2004. “What’s Not Wrong with Foundationalism.” PPR 68: 161-165.
Klein, P. 1999. “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.” Phil. Perspectives 13: 297-325.
Lyons, J. 2008. “Evidence, Experience, and Externalism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86: 461-479.
Pryor, J. 2005. “There Is Immediate Justification” in Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
Sosa, E. 1980. “The Raft and the Pyramid.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 3-26.

Week 5: Siegel on the Evaluation of Experience, Continued

Required Reading
Siegel, Susanna. 2017. Selections from The Rationality of Perception. Oxford University Press.

Optional Further Reading
Siegel, Susanna. 2017. Further selections from The Rationality of Perception. Oxford University Press.

Week 6: Moderate Coherentism and Haack's Hybrid View

Required Reading
Haack, Susan. “A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification.”

                        Strongly Recommended
Elgin, Catherine. 2005. “Non-Foundationalist Epistemology” in Steup, M. and Sosa, E.(eds.)
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
Poston, Ted. 2012. “Basic Reasons and First Philosophy...” Southern J. Phil. 50: 75-93.

                        Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews
                  Dancy, J. Selection from Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.

                        Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
                                    BonJour, L. 1997. “Haack on Justification and Experience.” Synthese 112: 13-23.
Haack, S. 1997. “Reply to BonJour.” Synthese 112: 25-35.
McGrew, L. and McGrew, T. 2008. “Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support.” Erkenntnis 68: 55-77.
Tramel, P. 2008. “Haack’s Foundherentism is a Foundationalism.” Synthese 160: 215–228.

Unit C. Internalism vs. Externalism (Two Weeks)

Week 7: Questioning the Motivations for Internalim

Required Reading
                                    Goldman, Alvin. 1999. “Internalism Exposed.” Journal of Philosophy 96: 271-293.

Strongly Recommended Reading
Srinivasan, Amia. Manuscript. “Radical Externalism.”

                        Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews
                                    Fumerton, R. Selection from Epistemology.
Poston, T. “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
                                    Pritchard, D. Selection from What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?

                        Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
                                    Bergmann, M. Selections from Justification without Awareness.
                                    Conee, E. and Feldman, R. “Internalism Defended”
                                    Feldman, R. “Justification Is Internal"
Goldman, A. “Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification.” Journal of
Philosophy 106: 309-338.
                                    Greco, J. “Justification Is Not Internal”
                                    Sosa, E. Selections from Epistemic Justification.
Srinivasan, Amia. “Normativity without Cartesian Privilege.” Philosophical Issues 25: 273-299.

Week 8: Externalism - Goldman's Reliabilism

Required Reading
Goldman, Alvin. 1979. “What Is Justified Belief?” in Pappas, G. (ed.) Justification
and Knowledge. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Strongly Recommended Reading
                                    Zagzebski, Linda. 1999. “From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology.” Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy 5:173-179.

                        Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews
Goldman, A. and Beddor, B. 2015. “Reliabilist Epistemology” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

                        Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
BonJour, L. 1980. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 53–74.
                                    Cohen, S. 1984. “Justification and Truth.” Philosophical Studies 46: 279-95.
Conee, E and Feldman, R. 1998. “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism.” Philosophical Studies 89: 1-29.
Fricker, E. “Unreliable Testimony”
Fumerton, R. Selection from Metaepistemology and Skepticism
                                    Goldman, A. Selections from Epistemology and Cognition
                                    Goldman, A. and Olson, E. “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge”
                                    Haack, S. “The Evidence against Reliabilism”

Part 2. Social Epistemology

Unit A. Testimony and Epistemic Injustice

Week 9: Lackey on the Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate

  Required Reading
Lackey, Jennifer. 2006. “Knowing from Testimony.” Philosophy Compass 5: 432-448.

                        Strongly Recommended Reading
Lackey, Jennifer. Introduction to The Epistemology of Testimony.

                        Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews
Adler, J. 2012. “Epistemological Problems of Testimony.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
                                    Pritchard, D. Selection from What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?
                                    Zagzebski, L. Selection from On Epistemology

                        Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
                                    Burge, T. 1993. “Content Preservation." Philosophical Review 102: 457-488.
                                    Coady, C. A. J. Testimony: A Philosophical Study
                                    Faulkner, P. “The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge”
Fricker, E. 1994. “Against Gullibility" in Chakrabarti, A. & Matilal, B. K. (eds.) Knowing from Words. Kluwer.
Fricker, E. 2006. "Second-Hand Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 592-618.
    Goldberg, S. "Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimony"
Lackey, J. “It Takes Two to Tango”
                                    Lackey, J. Selection from Learning from Words.
                                    Moran, R. 2005. “Getting Told and Being Believed.” Philosophers' Imprint 5.
Sosa, E. "Knowledge: Instrumental and Testimonial."

Week 10: Epistemic Injustice

Required Reading
Fricker, Miranda. 2003. “Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics
of Knowing.” Metaphilosophy 34: 154–173

                        Optional Further Reading: Overview
                                    McKinnon, Rachel. 2016. “Epistemic Injustice.” Philosophy Compass 11: 437–446.

                        Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
                                    Alcoff, L. 2010. “Epistemic Identities.” Episteme 7: 128-137.
Anderson, E. 2012. “Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions.” Social Epistemology 26: 163-173.
                                    Anderson, L. “Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Race”
    Dotson, K. “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing”
                                    Dotson, K. “A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression”
                                    Fricker, M. Selections from Epistemic Injustice
                                    Fricker, M. “Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology”

Unit B. Standpoint Epistemologies

Week 11: Anderson and Mills

                        Required Reading
Anderson, Elizabeth. “Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and Defense”
Mills, Charles. “Alternative Epistemologies"

                        Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts
Antony, L. “Quine as Feminist: The Radical Import of Naturalized Epistemology”
Collins, P. H. “Black Feminist Epistemology”
Fricker, Miranda. “Feminism in Epistemology: Pluralism without Postmodernism”
Harding, S. “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is Strong Objectivity?”
Harding, S. Selections from The Science Question in Feminism.
Hartsock, N. "The Feminist Standpoint."
Haslanger, S. "What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be"
Mills, C. “White Ignorance”
Smith, D. Selections from The Everyday World as Problematic.