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EDITED BOOK
The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason (with Ruth Chang), 2020. (Check out our Introduction and my Appendix.)
PAPERS (OUT)
"Suspending Properly" (with Errol Lord). In Oliveira, L. R. G. and Silva, P. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Routledge, 2022.
"Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons." Philosophical Studies, 2021.
"Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat" (with Errol Lord). In Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat (OUP), 2021.
"An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism." Philosophical Review, 2020.
"The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality." In Sylvan, K. and Chang, R. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, 2020.
"Non-Epistemic Perception as Technology." Philosophical Issues, 2020.
"Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2020.
''Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?'' Synthese, 2020.
"Responsibilism within Reason." In Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.) Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press, 2020.
"Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)" (with Errol Lord). In Bondy, P. and Carter, A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge, 2019.
"Epistemic Consequentialism and its Aftermath." Analysis, 2019.
"Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental" (with Errol Lord) The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2019.
"Veritism Unswamped." Mind, 2018.
"Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018.
"The Place of Reasons in Epistemology" (with Ernest Sosa). In Star, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, 2018.
"Responsibilism out of Character." In Alfano, M. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Epistemic Situationism (OUP), 2017.
"Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons" (with Daniel Fogal). In Ichikawa, J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, 2017.
"Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity." Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"Epistemic Reasons II: Basing." Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"The Illusion of Discretion." Synthese, 2016.
"Skorupski on Spontaneity, Apriority, and Normative Truth." Philosophical Quarterly, 2016. (Reply by Skorupski here.)
"What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be." Philosophical Studies, 2015.
"How to Be a Redundant Realist." Episteme, 2012. (Reply by List and Pettit here.)
"Truth Monism without Teleology." Thought, 2012.
PAPERS (FORTHCOMING)
"The Possibility of Internalist Epistemology." Forthcoming in Roeber, B., Steup, M., Sosa, E., and Turri, J. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
"Beginning in Wonder: Suspensive Attitudes and Epistemic Dilemmas" (with Errol Lord). In Hughes, N. (ed.) Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.
"Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond)." Forthcoming in Lasonen-Aarnio, M. and Littlejohn, C. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence.
REVIEWS
Chakrabarti, A. Realisms Interlinked. Mind, Forthcoming.
Star, D. Knowing Better. The Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2019.
Chartier, G. The Logic of Commitment. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2018.
Flanagan, O. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Analysis, 2017.
Hirose, I. and Olson, E. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (with Errol Lord). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
'Reasons in Epistemology'. First version: Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2014; old copy available here. The entry is being updated in light of new work. I also have another one in the works on foundationalism.
The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason (with Ruth Chang), 2020. (Check out our Introduction and my Appendix.)
PAPERS (OUT)
"Suspending Properly" (with Errol Lord). In Oliveira, L. R. G. and Silva, P. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Routledge, 2022.
"Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons." Philosophical Studies, 2021.
"Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat" (with Errol Lord). In Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat (OUP), 2021.
"An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism." Philosophical Review, 2020.
"The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality." In Sylvan, K. and Chang, R. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, 2020.
"Non-Epistemic Perception as Technology." Philosophical Issues, 2020.
"Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2020.
''Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?'' Synthese, 2020.
"Responsibilism within Reason." In Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.) Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press, 2020.
"Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)" (with Errol Lord). In Bondy, P. and Carter, A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge, 2019.
"Epistemic Consequentialism and its Aftermath." Analysis, 2019.
"Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental" (with Errol Lord) The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2019.
"Veritism Unswamped." Mind, 2018.
"Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018.
"The Place of Reasons in Epistemology" (with Ernest Sosa). In Star, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, 2018.
"Responsibilism out of Character." In Alfano, M. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Epistemic Situationism (OUP), 2017.
"Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons" (with Daniel Fogal). In Ichikawa, J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, 2017.
"Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity." Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"Epistemic Reasons II: Basing." Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"The Illusion of Discretion." Synthese, 2016.
"Skorupski on Spontaneity, Apriority, and Normative Truth." Philosophical Quarterly, 2016. (Reply by Skorupski here.)
"What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be." Philosophical Studies, 2015.
"How to Be a Redundant Realist." Episteme, 2012. (Reply by List and Pettit here.)
"Truth Monism without Teleology." Thought, 2012.
PAPERS (FORTHCOMING)
"The Possibility of Internalist Epistemology." Forthcoming in Roeber, B., Steup, M., Sosa, E., and Turri, J. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
"Beginning in Wonder: Suspensive Attitudes and Epistemic Dilemmas" (with Errol Lord). In Hughes, N. (ed.) Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.
"Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond)." Forthcoming in Lasonen-Aarnio, M. and Littlejohn, C. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence.
REVIEWS
Chakrabarti, A. Realisms Interlinked. Mind, Forthcoming.
Star, D. Knowing Better. The Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2019.
Chartier, G. The Logic of Commitment. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2018.
Flanagan, O. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Analysis, 2017.
Hirose, I. and Olson, E. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (with Errol Lord). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
'Reasons in Epistemology'. First version: Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2014; old copy available here. The entry is being updated in light of new work. I also have another one in the works on foundationalism.
