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ETHICS
SPRING 2018
Lectures take place Mondays from 3-4pm in 65/1133
and Thursdays from 4-6pm in 65/1133
SCHEDULE OF READINGS
The readings divide into required, strongly recommended,
and optional further readings. I include the optional readings
just in case you find the topic especially interesting or would like
to write a paper on nearby issues.
Required readings are available for registered students on this
password-protected page. Most of the optional further readings
can be found for free online or through the university library.
Part 1. Meta-Ethical Preliminaries
Week 1: Moral Relativism - Its Varieties and Status
Required
Mary Midgley. 1981. ‘Trying Out One’s New Sword’ in Heart and
Mind: The Varieties of Moral Experience. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Strongly Recommended
James Rachels. 1986. ‘The Challenge of Cultural Relativism’ in
The Elements of Moral Philosophy. New York: McGraw Hill.
Further Reading
Michele Moody-Adams. 2002. ‘The Empirical Underdetermination
of Descriptive Cultural Relativism’ in Fieldwork in Familiar Places.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
David Wong. 2006. Natural Moralities. Oxford University Press.
Gilbert Harman. 1975. ‘Moral Relativism Defended.’ Philosophical Review 85: 3-22.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on African and Chinese ethics:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-chinese/
Week 2: The Nature of Moral Judgment
Required
R. M. Hare. 1991. ‘Universal Prescriptivism’ in Singer, P. (ed.)
A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell.
Further Reading
Simon Blackburn. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Oxford University Press.
Mark Schroeder. 2010. Non-Cognitivism in Ethics. London: Routledge.
Charles L. Stevenson. 1937. ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.’ Mind 46: 14-31.
Stanford Encyclopedia entry on cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/
Week 3: Morality, Reason, and Motivation
Required
Philippa Foot. 1972. ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.’
Philosophical Review 81: 305-316.
Further Reading
Stephen Darwall. 1997. ‘Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality:
An Introduction’ in Darwall, S., Gibbard, A., and Railton, P. (eds.) M
oral Discourse and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
David Hume. Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III;
Book III, Part I, Section I.
Christine Korsgaard. 1997. ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’ in Cullity, G.
and Gaut, B. (eds.) Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Christine Korsgaard. 1986. ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason.’
The Journal of Philosophy 83: 5-25.
Derek Parfit. 2011. On What Matters, Volume One, Part One.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Derek Parfit. 1997. ‘Reasons and Motivation.’ Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 71: 99-146.
Part 2. What Matters Morally?
Week 4: Goodness and its Distribution
Required
Thomas Hurka. 2006. ‘Value Theory’ in Copp, D. (ed.) The Oxford
Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
Further Reading
Shelly Kagan. 1998. Normative Ethics, Chapter 2. Westview Press.
Derek Parfit. 1984. ‘What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best?’ in Reason
and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Alexandra Plakias and Valerie Tiberius. 2010. ‘Well-Being’ in Doris, J. (ed.)
The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Derek Parfit. 1997. ‘Equality and Priority.’ Ratio 10: 201-221.
Larry Temkin. 2000. ‘Equality, Priority, and the Leveling Down Objection’
in Clayton, M. and Williams, A. (eds.) The Ideal of Equality. Macmillan.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles on well-being,
intrinsic and extrinsic value, egalitarianism and distributive justice:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/
Week 5: Values beyond 'Goods' and Relational Equality
Required
Elizabeth Anderson. 1999. ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 109: 287-337.
Strongly Recommended
Elizabeth Anderson. 1993. Selection from Value in Ethics and Economics.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
T. M. Scanlon. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Chapter 2.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Further Reading
Miranda Fricker. 2007. Introduction to Epistemic Injustice.
Oxford University Press.
Charles Mills. 2015. ‘Racial Equality' in Hull, G. (ed.)
The Equal Society. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Samuel Scheffler. 2003. ‘What Is Egalitarianism?’
Philosophy and Public Affairs 2003: 5-39.
Samuel Scheffler. 2015. ‘The Practice of Equality’ in Fourie, C.,
Schuppert, F. and Wallimann-Helmer, I. (eds.) Social Equality.
Oxford University Press.
Fabian Schuppert. 2015. ‘Being Equals’ in Fourie, C., Schuppert, F.
and Wallimann-Helmer, I. (eds.) Social Equality. Oxford University Press.
Naomi Zack. Equality after the History of Philosophy, Chapter 8.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Week 6: Doing and Allowing Harm, Rights, and Self-Ownership, Part 1
Required
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1985. ‘The Trolley Problem.’ The Yale
Law Journal 94: 1395-1415.
Further Reading
Philippa Foot. 1967. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine
of Double Effect.’ Oxford Review 5: 5-15.
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1976. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and the
Trolley Problem.’ The Monist 59: 204-217.
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 2008. ‘Turning the Trolley.’ Philosophy and
Public Affairs 36: 359-374.
Fiona Woollard. 2012. ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, Part 1.’
Philosophy Compass 7: 448-458.
Michael Tooley. 1994. ‘Killing and Letting Die: An Irrelevant Distinction’
in Norcross, A. and Steinbock, B. (eds.) Killing and Letting Die.
New York: Fordham University Press.
Week 7: Doing and Allowing Harm, Rights, and Self-Ownership, Part 2
Required
Fiona Woollard. 2012. ‘If This Is My Body… A Defense of the Doctrine of
Doing and Allowing.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94: 315-341.
Further Reading
Jeff McMahan. 1993. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid.’ Ethics 250-279.
Warren Quinn. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of
Doing and Allowing.’ The Philosophical Review 98: 287-312.
Fiona Woollard. 2012. ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, Part 2.’ Philosophy
Compass 7: 459-469.
Fiona Woollard. 2015. Doing and Allowing Harm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Week 8: Intention
Required
Jeff McMahan. 2009. ‘Intention, Permissibility, Terrorism, and War.’
Philosophical Perspectives 23: 345-372.
Further Reading
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1991. ‘Self-Defense.’ Philosophy and
Public Affairs 20: 283-310.
Doug Husak. 2009. ‘The Costs to Criminal Law Theory of Supposing that
Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility.’ Criminal Law and Philosophy 3: 51-70.
F. M. Kamm. 2008. ‘Terrorism and Intending Evil.’ Philosophy and
Public Affairs 36: 157-186.
Victor Tadros. 2011. ‘Wrongdoing and Motivation’ in The Ends of Harm.
Oxford University Press.
T. M. Scanlon. 2008. Moral Dimensions, Chapters 1 and 2.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Warren Quinn. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The
Doctrine of Double Effect.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-351.
Part 3: Generalist Moral Theory and its Critics
Week 9: Consequentialism
Required
Henry Sidgwick. 1874. Selections from Methods of Ethics. London: MacMillan.
Strongly Recommended
Henry Sidgwick. Further Selections from Methods of Ethics.
Roger Crisp. The Cosmos of Duty, Chapters 1 and 7.
Optional Further Reading
Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy entries on consequentialism:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule/
Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy entry on the history of utilitarianism:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/
Stanford Encylopedia entries on Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, and Moore:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bentham/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/#MillPracPhil
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/
Week 10: Non-Consequentialism
Required
Allen Wood. 2006. ‘The Supreme Principle of Morality’, Sections 1 and 2,
in Guyer, P. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Optional Further Reading
F. M. Kamm. 2006. ‘Nonconsequentialism’ in Intricate Ethics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Immanuel Kant. 1785. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.
W. D. Ross. 1930. ‘What Makes Right Acts Right?’ in The Right and
the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Barbara Herman. ‘Leaving Deontology Behind’ in The Practice of
Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thomas Hill. 1980. ‘Humanity as an End in Itself.’ Ethics 91: 84-99.
Christine Korsgaard. 1986. ‘Kant’s Formula of Humanity.’
Kant-Studien 77: 183-202.
Allen Wood. 2002. ‘What Is Kantian Ethics?’ in Wood, A. (transl.)
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Week 11: Unprincipled Ethics and Non-Ideal Theory
Required
Charles Mills. 2005. ‘‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology.’ Hypatia 20: 165-184.
Philosophy Bites interview with Jonathan Dancy on Moral Particularism
http://traffic.libsyn.com/philosophybites/Jonathan_Dancy_on_Moral_Particularism.mp3
Optional Further Reading
Mark Lance and Margaret O. Little. 2006. ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’
in Copp, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Amartya Sen. 2006. ‘What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?’
The Journal of Philosophy 103: 215-238.
Tommie Shelby. 2004. ‘Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations.’
Fordham Law Review 72: 1697-1714.
Laura Valentini. 2012. ‘Ideal Theory vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A
Conceptual Map.’ Philosophy Compass 7: 654-664.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on moral particularism:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/
SPRING 2018
Lectures take place Mondays from 3-4pm in 65/1133
and Thursdays from 4-6pm in 65/1133
SCHEDULE OF READINGS
The readings divide into required, strongly recommended,
and optional further readings. I include the optional readings
just in case you find the topic especially interesting or would like
to write a paper on nearby issues.
Required readings are available for registered students on this
password-protected page. Most of the optional further readings
can be found for free online or through the university library.
Part 1. Meta-Ethical Preliminaries
Week 1: Moral Relativism - Its Varieties and Status
Required
Mary Midgley. 1981. ‘Trying Out One’s New Sword’ in Heart and
Mind: The Varieties of Moral Experience. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Strongly Recommended
James Rachels. 1986. ‘The Challenge of Cultural Relativism’ in
The Elements of Moral Philosophy. New York: McGraw Hill.
Further Reading
Michele Moody-Adams. 2002. ‘The Empirical Underdetermination
of Descriptive Cultural Relativism’ in Fieldwork in Familiar Places.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
David Wong. 2006. Natural Moralities. Oxford University Press.
Gilbert Harman. 1975. ‘Moral Relativism Defended.’ Philosophical Review 85: 3-22.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on African and Chinese ethics:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-chinese/
Week 2: The Nature of Moral Judgment
Required
R. M. Hare. 1991. ‘Universal Prescriptivism’ in Singer, P. (ed.)
A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell.
Further Reading
Simon Blackburn. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Oxford University Press.
Mark Schroeder. 2010. Non-Cognitivism in Ethics. London: Routledge.
Charles L. Stevenson. 1937. ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.’ Mind 46: 14-31.
Stanford Encyclopedia entry on cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/
Week 3: Morality, Reason, and Motivation
Required
Philippa Foot. 1972. ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.’
Philosophical Review 81: 305-316.
Further Reading
Stephen Darwall. 1997. ‘Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality:
An Introduction’ in Darwall, S., Gibbard, A., and Railton, P. (eds.) M
oral Discourse and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
David Hume. Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III;
Book III, Part I, Section I.
Christine Korsgaard. 1997. ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’ in Cullity, G.
and Gaut, B. (eds.) Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Christine Korsgaard. 1986. ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason.’
The Journal of Philosophy 83: 5-25.
Derek Parfit. 2011. On What Matters, Volume One, Part One.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Derek Parfit. 1997. ‘Reasons and Motivation.’ Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 71: 99-146.
Part 2. What Matters Morally?
Week 4: Goodness and its Distribution
Required
Thomas Hurka. 2006. ‘Value Theory’ in Copp, D. (ed.) The Oxford
Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
Further Reading
Shelly Kagan. 1998. Normative Ethics, Chapter 2. Westview Press.
Derek Parfit. 1984. ‘What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best?’ in Reason
and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Alexandra Plakias and Valerie Tiberius. 2010. ‘Well-Being’ in Doris, J. (ed.)
The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Derek Parfit. 1997. ‘Equality and Priority.’ Ratio 10: 201-221.
Larry Temkin. 2000. ‘Equality, Priority, and the Leveling Down Objection’
in Clayton, M. and Williams, A. (eds.) The Ideal of Equality. Macmillan.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles on well-being,
intrinsic and extrinsic value, egalitarianism and distributive justice:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/
Week 5: Values beyond 'Goods' and Relational Equality
Required
Elizabeth Anderson. 1999. ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 109: 287-337.
Strongly Recommended
Elizabeth Anderson. 1993. Selection from Value in Ethics and Economics.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
T. M. Scanlon. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Chapter 2.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Further Reading
Miranda Fricker. 2007. Introduction to Epistemic Injustice.
Oxford University Press.
Charles Mills. 2015. ‘Racial Equality' in Hull, G. (ed.)
The Equal Society. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Samuel Scheffler. 2003. ‘What Is Egalitarianism?’
Philosophy and Public Affairs 2003: 5-39.
Samuel Scheffler. 2015. ‘The Practice of Equality’ in Fourie, C.,
Schuppert, F. and Wallimann-Helmer, I. (eds.) Social Equality.
Oxford University Press.
Fabian Schuppert. 2015. ‘Being Equals’ in Fourie, C., Schuppert, F.
and Wallimann-Helmer, I. (eds.) Social Equality. Oxford University Press.
Naomi Zack. Equality after the History of Philosophy, Chapter 8.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Week 6: Doing and Allowing Harm, Rights, and Self-Ownership, Part 1
Required
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1985. ‘The Trolley Problem.’ The Yale
Law Journal 94: 1395-1415.
Further Reading
Philippa Foot. 1967. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine
of Double Effect.’ Oxford Review 5: 5-15.
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1976. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and the
Trolley Problem.’ The Monist 59: 204-217.
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 2008. ‘Turning the Trolley.’ Philosophy and
Public Affairs 36: 359-374.
Fiona Woollard. 2012. ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, Part 1.’
Philosophy Compass 7: 448-458.
Michael Tooley. 1994. ‘Killing and Letting Die: An Irrelevant Distinction’
in Norcross, A. and Steinbock, B. (eds.) Killing and Letting Die.
New York: Fordham University Press.
Week 7: Doing and Allowing Harm, Rights, and Self-Ownership, Part 2
Required
Fiona Woollard. 2012. ‘If This Is My Body… A Defense of the Doctrine of
Doing and Allowing.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94: 315-341.
Further Reading
Jeff McMahan. 1993. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid.’ Ethics 250-279.
Warren Quinn. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of
Doing and Allowing.’ The Philosophical Review 98: 287-312.
Fiona Woollard. 2012. ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, Part 2.’ Philosophy
Compass 7: 459-469.
Fiona Woollard. 2015. Doing and Allowing Harm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Week 8: Intention
Required
Jeff McMahan. 2009. ‘Intention, Permissibility, Terrorism, and War.’
Philosophical Perspectives 23: 345-372.
Further Reading
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1991. ‘Self-Defense.’ Philosophy and
Public Affairs 20: 283-310.
Doug Husak. 2009. ‘The Costs to Criminal Law Theory of Supposing that
Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility.’ Criminal Law and Philosophy 3: 51-70.
F. M. Kamm. 2008. ‘Terrorism and Intending Evil.’ Philosophy and
Public Affairs 36: 157-186.
Victor Tadros. 2011. ‘Wrongdoing and Motivation’ in The Ends of Harm.
Oxford University Press.
T. M. Scanlon. 2008. Moral Dimensions, Chapters 1 and 2.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Warren Quinn. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The
Doctrine of Double Effect.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-351.
Part 3: Generalist Moral Theory and its Critics
Week 9: Consequentialism
Required
Henry Sidgwick. 1874. Selections from Methods of Ethics. London: MacMillan.
Strongly Recommended
Henry Sidgwick. Further Selections from Methods of Ethics.
Roger Crisp. The Cosmos of Duty, Chapters 1 and 7.
Optional Further Reading
Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy entries on consequentialism:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule/
Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy entry on the history of utilitarianism:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/
Stanford Encylopedia entries on Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, and Moore:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bentham/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/#MillPracPhil
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/
Week 10: Non-Consequentialism
Required
Allen Wood. 2006. ‘The Supreme Principle of Morality’, Sections 1 and 2,
in Guyer, P. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Optional Further Reading
F. M. Kamm. 2006. ‘Nonconsequentialism’ in Intricate Ethics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Immanuel Kant. 1785. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.
W. D. Ross. 1930. ‘What Makes Right Acts Right?’ in The Right and
the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Barbara Herman. ‘Leaving Deontology Behind’ in The Practice of
Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thomas Hill. 1980. ‘Humanity as an End in Itself.’ Ethics 91: 84-99.
Christine Korsgaard. 1986. ‘Kant’s Formula of Humanity.’
Kant-Studien 77: 183-202.
Allen Wood. 2002. ‘What Is Kantian Ethics?’ in Wood, A. (transl.)
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Week 11: Unprincipled Ethics and Non-Ideal Theory
Required
Charles Mills. 2005. ‘‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology.’ Hypatia 20: 165-184.
Philosophy Bites interview with Jonathan Dancy on Moral Particularism
http://traffic.libsyn.com/philosophybites/Jonathan_Dancy_on_Moral_Particularism.mp3
Optional Further Reading
Mark Lance and Margaret O. Little. 2006. ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’
in Copp, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Amartya Sen. 2006. ‘What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?’
The Journal of Philosophy 103: 215-238.
Tommie Shelby. 2004. ‘Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations.’
Fordham Law Review 72: 1697-1714.
Laura Valentini. 2012. ‘Ideal Theory vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A
Conceptual Map.’ Philosophy Compass 7: 654-664.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on moral particularism:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/
