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EPISTEMOLOGY
FALL 2018
Meets Tuesdays from 9-10 in 54/8033
and Wednesdays from 11-1 in 58/1065
MANIFESTO
Epistemology is dedicated to questions about knowledge and the norms governing belief-formation.
Some questions we will consider include:
What is knowledge? Is knowledge just a special case of belief
(e.g., a belief that is accurate and justified?)
What is justified belief? Is evidence necessary for justified belief,
or can some beliefs be justified without evidence?
Can arguments for skepticism be answered?
We will investigate these questions from historical and contemporary angles.
In the first unit of the module, we will consider two approaches to the nature of knowledge. On the one hand,
many 20th century philosophers and a handful of historical philosophers held that knowledge is a species
of belief. On this view, a person knows that a proposition is true just when the person correctly believes that it
is true in virtue of justifiably believing it is true. But there is a long history of opposition to analyzing
knowledge in terms of belief going back to ancient Greek and classical Indian philosophy, and this
tradition was robust until the mid-2oth century. This tradition has recently been revived in contemporary
philosophy by the Oxford philosopher Timothy Williamson, though there was an earlier history in the UK,
with realists like Helen Wodehouse, John Cook Wilson, and H. A. Prichard defending this kind of view.
We will consider both traditions, as well as the possibility of a compromise that captures the insights
of both while avoiding their respective flaws.
We will then spend several weeks considering the nature of justified belief. We will begin by considering
whether justification is rightly understood as having a foundationalist structure, where justification begins
with a set of basic beliefs that are not justified by means of inference, and on the basis of which all other beliefs
derive their justification by inference. We will consider two kinds of foundationalist approaches—the ‘internalist’
approach according to which the foundations of justified belief are internal mental states, and an ‘externalist’
approach according to which basic beliefs are justified simply by being products of reliable mental faculties.
We will then consider some challenges to the structure of foundationalist epistemology from the
‘foundherentist’ theorist Susan Haack and the coherentist Catherine Elgin.
We will conclude the module by considering skeptical challenges to knowledge and justified belief
and some recent attempts to answer these challenges. This part of the module will be taught
by our PhD student in epistemology, Ben Paget-Woods.
SCHEDULE OF READINGS
For each week, the readings mainly divide into required,
strongly recommended, and optional further readings. I include the
optional readings just in case you find the topic especially interesting
and would like to write a paper on it or simply learn more.
Students who are registered for the module can find links to all
readings to which the University has access through the library
on this password-protected page. Below there are links to readings
in the public domain for others, as well as links to journal articles
to which others may have access at their universities.
Part 1. Knowledge
Week 1: Introduction
Required reading
Nagel, Jennifer. Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction, Chapters 1 and 4
Strongly recommended reading
Zagzebski, Linda. ‘What Is Knowledge?’
Optional further reading
Chisholm, R. Selection from The Theory of Knowledge (1st Edition)
Taylor, A. E. ‘Knowing and Believing’ (Chapter X in Philosophical Studies)
Williamson, T. ‘Knowledge as a Mental State’
Russell, B. Problems of Philosophy, (esp.) chapter 13 and chs. 5-7 and 11
Wodehouse, H. 'Knowledge as Presentation.' LINK
Wodehouse, H. The Presentation of Reality, Part 1
Prichard, H. A. Knowledge and Perception, chapter 5
Cook Wilson, J. Selections from Statement and Inference
Chatterjee, S. C. The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, chapters II and III
Bhatt, G. P. The Basic Ways of Knowing, chapters II and III
Matilal, B. K. Selection from Perception
Week 2: The Theaetetus Problem and Some Historical Perspectives on It
Required reading
Plato. Selections from Theaetetus, Republic, and Meno
Strongly recommended reading
Antognazza, M. 'The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of its History' LINK
Optional further reading
Gerson, Lloyd. Selection from Ancient Epistemology
Dutant, J. 'The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis' LINK
Week 3: Knowledge as Justified True Belief (+) and the Gettier Problem
Required reading
Gettier, Edmund. 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' LINK
Zagzebski, Linda. ‘The Inescapability of Gettier Problems’ LINK
Strongly recommended reading
Ichikawa, J. J. and Steup, M. (eds.) 'The Analysis of Knowledge' LINK
Optional further reading
Zagzebski, L. ‘What Is Knowledge?’
Matilal, B. K. Selection from Perception
Russell, B. The Problems of Philosophy, chapter 13
Week 4: Early Attempts to Solve the Gettier Problem
Required reading:
Sections 4-6 of Ichikawa and Steup’s ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’ LINK
Optional further reading
Comesaña, J. ‘Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals’ LINK
Roush, S. Selection from Tracking Truth
Goldman, A. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’ LINK
Harman, G. Selection from Thought
Klein, P. ‘Knowledge, Causality and Defeasibility’ LINK
Lehrer, K. and Paxson, T. ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’ LINK
Nozick, R. Selection from Philosophical Explanations
Sosa, E. ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’ LINK
Week 5: The State of the Art: Sosa and Williamson
Required viewing/reading
Video lecture by Ernest Sosa on the nature and value of knowledge
Timothy Williamson’s ‘Knowledge and Belief’
Optional further reading
E. Sosa, Selections from Apt Belief and
Reflective Knowledge: A Virtue Epistemology
E. Sosa, Selections from Epistemology
J. Lackey, ‘Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know’ LINK
D. Pritchard, ‘Apt Performance and Epistemic Value’ LINK
K. Sylvan, ‘Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?’ LINK
Part 2. Justified Belief
Week 6: Justification and the Regress Problem
Required reading
Sosa, E. 'The Raft and the Pyramid'
Optional further reading
BonJour, L. ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?’ LINK
Sellars, W. ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ LINK
Haack, S. ‘Foundationalism vs. Coherentism: A Dichotomy Disclaimed’
Siegel, S. Selection from The Rationality of Perception
Week 7: Internalist Foundationalism
Required reading
Hasan, A. and Fumerton, R. ‘Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification’ LINK
Optional further reading
Hasan, A. ‘Access Internalism, Mentalism, and Reliabilism’
Fales, E. ‘The Given and Knowledge’
Feldman, R. ‘Justification is Internal’
Fumerton, R. ‘Traditional (Internalist) Foundationalism’
Goldman, A. I. ‘Internalism Exposed’ LINK
Sosa, E. Selection from Epistemic Justification
Poston, T. ‘Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology’ LINK
Week 8: Externalist Foundationalism
Required reading
Goldman, A. ‘What Is Justified Belief?’
Optional further reading
BonJour, L. ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’
Cohen, S. ‘Justification and Truth’ LINK
Conee, E. and Feldman, R. ‘The Generality Problem for Reliabilism' LINK
Fumerton, R. Selection from Metaepistemology and Skepticism
Week 9: Foundherentism and Coherentism
Required reading
Haack, Susan. ‘A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification’
Strongly recommended reading
Peter, Murphy. ‘Coherentism in Epistemology’ LINK
Catherine, Elgin. ‘Non-Foundationalist Epistemology’
Optional further reading
Dancy, J. ‘Coherence Theories’
BonJour, L. ‘Haack on Justification and Experience’ LINK
Haack, S. ‘Foundherentism Articulated’
Haack, S. ‘Reply to BonJour’ LINK
Tramel, P. ‘Haack’s Foundherentism is a Foundationalism’ LINK
Part 3: Scepticism
Week 10: Can the Sceptic Be Answered? Part 1
Required reading
Rinard, Susanna. 'Reasoning One's Way out of Scepticism' LINK
Optional further reading
Pryor, J. ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist’ LINK
Pryor, J. ‘What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?’ LINK
Chalmers, D. ‘The Matrix as Metaphysics’ LINK
Vogel, J. ‘Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation’ LINK
Williamson, T. ‘Scepticism and Evidence’ LINK
Sosa, E. ‘Philosophical Skepticism and Epistemic Circularity'
Week 11: Can the Sceptic Be Answered? Part 2
Required reading
Lewis, David. ‘Elusive Knowledge’ LINK
Optional further reading
J. Ichikawa, Introduction to The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism
J. Ichikawa, Selections from Contextualizing Knowledge
FALL 2018
Meets Tuesdays from 9-10 in 54/8033
and Wednesdays from 11-1 in 58/1065
MANIFESTO
Epistemology is dedicated to questions about knowledge and the norms governing belief-formation.
Some questions we will consider include:
What is knowledge? Is knowledge just a special case of belief
(e.g., a belief that is accurate and justified?)
What is justified belief? Is evidence necessary for justified belief,
or can some beliefs be justified without evidence?
Can arguments for skepticism be answered?
We will investigate these questions from historical and contemporary angles.
In the first unit of the module, we will consider two approaches to the nature of knowledge. On the one hand,
many 20th century philosophers and a handful of historical philosophers held that knowledge is a species
of belief. On this view, a person knows that a proposition is true just when the person correctly believes that it
is true in virtue of justifiably believing it is true. But there is a long history of opposition to analyzing
knowledge in terms of belief going back to ancient Greek and classical Indian philosophy, and this
tradition was robust until the mid-2oth century. This tradition has recently been revived in contemporary
philosophy by the Oxford philosopher Timothy Williamson, though there was an earlier history in the UK,
with realists like Helen Wodehouse, John Cook Wilson, and H. A. Prichard defending this kind of view.
We will consider both traditions, as well as the possibility of a compromise that captures the insights
of both while avoiding their respective flaws.
We will then spend several weeks considering the nature of justified belief. We will begin by considering
whether justification is rightly understood as having a foundationalist structure, where justification begins
with a set of basic beliefs that are not justified by means of inference, and on the basis of which all other beliefs
derive their justification by inference. We will consider two kinds of foundationalist approaches—the ‘internalist’
approach according to which the foundations of justified belief are internal mental states, and an ‘externalist’
approach according to which basic beliefs are justified simply by being products of reliable mental faculties.
We will then consider some challenges to the structure of foundationalist epistemology from the
‘foundherentist’ theorist Susan Haack and the coherentist Catherine Elgin.
We will conclude the module by considering skeptical challenges to knowledge and justified belief
and some recent attempts to answer these challenges. This part of the module will be taught
by our PhD student in epistemology, Ben Paget-Woods.
SCHEDULE OF READINGS
For each week, the readings mainly divide into required,
strongly recommended, and optional further readings. I include the
optional readings just in case you find the topic especially interesting
and would like to write a paper on it or simply learn more.
Students who are registered for the module can find links to all
readings to which the University has access through the library
on this password-protected page. Below there are links to readings
in the public domain for others, as well as links to journal articles
to which others may have access at their universities.
Part 1. Knowledge
Week 1: Introduction
Required reading
Nagel, Jennifer. Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction, Chapters 1 and 4
Strongly recommended reading
Zagzebski, Linda. ‘What Is Knowledge?’
Optional further reading
Chisholm, R. Selection from The Theory of Knowledge (1st Edition)
Taylor, A. E. ‘Knowing and Believing’ (Chapter X in Philosophical Studies)
Williamson, T. ‘Knowledge as a Mental State’
Russell, B. Problems of Philosophy, (esp.) chapter 13 and chs. 5-7 and 11
Wodehouse, H. 'Knowledge as Presentation.' LINK
Wodehouse, H. The Presentation of Reality, Part 1
Prichard, H. A. Knowledge and Perception, chapter 5
Cook Wilson, J. Selections from Statement and Inference
Chatterjee, S. C. The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, chapters II and III
Bhatt, G. P. The Basic Ways of Knowing, chapters II and III
Matilal, B. K. Selection from Perception
Week 2: The Theaetetus Problem and Some Historical Perspectives on It
Required reading
Plato. Selections from Theaetetus, Republic, and Meno
Strongly recommended reading
Antognazza, M. 'The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of its History' LINK
Optional further reading
Gerson, Lloyd. Selection from Ancient Epistemology
Dutant, J. 'The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis' LINK
Week 3: Knowledge as Justified True Belief (+) and the Gettier Problem
Required reading
Gettier, Edmund. 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' LINK
Zagzebski, Linda. ‘The Inescapability of Gettier Problems’ LINK
Strongly recommended reading
Ichikawa, J. J. and Steup, M. (eds.) 'The Analysis of Knowledge' LINK
Optional further reading
Zagzebski, L. ‘What Is Knowledge?’
Matilal, B. K. Selection from Perception
Russell, B. The Problems of Philosophy, chapter 13
Week 4: Early Attempts to Solve the Gettier Problem
Required reading:
Sections 4-6 of Ichikawa and Steup’s ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’ LINK
Optional further reading
Comesaña, J. ‘Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals’ LINK
Roush, S. Selection from Tracking Truth
Goldman, A. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’ LINK
Harman, G. Selection from Thought
Klein, P. ‘Knowledge, Causality and Defeasibility’ LINK
Lehrer, K. and Paxson, T. ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’ LINK
Nozick, R. Selection from Philosophical Explanations
Sosa, E. ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’ LINK
Week 5: The State of the Art: Sosa and Williamson
Required viewing/reading
Video lecture by Ernest Sosa on the nature and value of knowledge
Timothy Williamson’s ‘Knowledge and Belief’
Optional further reading
E. Sosa, Selections from Apt Belief and
Reflective Knowledge: A Virtue Epistemology
E. Sosa, Selections from Epistemology
J. Lackey, ‘Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know’ LINK
D. Pritchard, ‘Apt Performance and Epistemic Value’ LINK
K. Sylvan, ‘Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?’ LINK
Part 2. Justified Belief
Week 6: Justification and the Regress Problem
Required reading
Sosa, E. 'The Raft and the Pyramid'
Optional further reading
BonJour, L. ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?’ LINK
Sellars, W. ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ LINK
Haack, S. ‘Foundationalism vs. Coherentism: A Dichotomy Disclaimed’
Siegel, S. Selection from The Rationality of Perception
Week 7: Internalist Foundationalism
Required reading
Hasan, A. and Fumerton, R. ‘Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification’ LINK
Optional further reading
Hasan, A. ‘Access Internalism, Mentalism, and Reliabilism’
Fales, E. ‘The Given and Knowledge’
Feldman, R. ‘Justification is Internal’
Fumerton, R. ‘Traditional (Internalist) Foundationalism’
Goldman, A. I. ‘Internalism Exposed’ LINK
Sosa, E. Selection from Epistemic Justification
Poston, T. ‘Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology’ LINK
Week 8: Externalist Foundationalism
Required reading
Goldman, A. ‘What Is Justified Belief?’
Optional further reading
BonJour, L. ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’
Cohen, S. ‘Justification and Truth’ LINK
Conee, E. and Feldman, R. ‘The Generality Problem for Reliabilism' LINK
Fumerton, R. Selection from Metaepistemology and Skepticism
Week 9: Foundherentism and Coherentism
Required reading
Haack, Susan. ‘A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification’
Strongly recommended reading
Peter, Murphy. ‘Coherentism in Epistemology’ LINK
Catherine, Elgin. ‘Non-Foundationalist Epistemology’
Optional further reading
Dancy, J. ‘Coherence Theories’
BonJour, L. ‘Haack on Justification and Experience’ LINK
Haack, S. ‘Foundherentism Articulated’
Haack, S. ‘Reply to BonJour’ LINK
Tramel, P. ‘Haack’s Foundherentism is a Foundationalism’ LINK
Part 3: Scepticism
Week 10: Can the Sceptic Be Answered? Part 1
Required reading
Rinard, Susanna. 'Reasoning One's Way out of Scepticism' LINK
Optional further reading
Pryor, J. ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist’ LINK
Pryor, J. ‘What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?’ LINK
Chalmers, D. ‘The Matrix as Metaphysics’ LINK
Vogel, J. ‘Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation’ LINK
Williamson, T. ‘Scepticism and Evidence’ LINK
Sosa, E. ‘Philosophical Skepticism and Epistemic Circularity'
Week 11: Can the Sceptic Be Answered? Part 2
Required reading
Lewis, David. ‘Elusive Knowledge’ LINK
Optional further reading
J. Ichikawa, Introduction to The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism
J. Ichikawa, Selections from Contextualizing Knowledge
