Meets Mondays in 58/1039 from 4-5 and Thursdays in 85/2207 from 9-11 SCHEDULE OF READINGS
For each week, the readings mainly divide into required and optional further readings. I include the optional readings just in case you find the topic especially interesting and would like to write a paper on it or simply learn more.
Note that a great many of the readings can be found online (see links for use when connected to campus internet).
Part 1. Introduction
Week 1 – The Possibility and Nature of the Ethics of Belief
Required Reading There is none for this week. But see here, here, and here for some notes and slides for the week, and see the references in the notes for optional further reading.
Part 2. The Normative Ethics of Belief
Week 2 – Evidentialism vs. Pragmatism
Required Reading Rinard, Susanna. “Against the New Evidentialists.” Shah, Nishi. "A New Argument for Evidentialism."
Optional Further Reading Clifford, William K. “The Ethics of Belief." James, William. “The Will to Believe." Leary, Stephanie. "In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.” McHugh, Conor. “The Illusion of Exclusivity.” Nolfi, Kate. “Why Evidence (and Only Evidence) Can Justify Belief.”
Week 3 – Pragmatic Encroachment
Required Reading Brown, Jessica. “Knowledge and Practical Reason.” Strongly Recommended Reading Stanley, Jason and Hawthorne, John. “Knowledge and Action.”
Optional Further Reading Brown, Jessica. “Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.” Brown, Jessica. “Practical Reasoning, Decision Theory, and Anti-Intellectualism.” Brown, Jessica. “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.” Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.” Hawthorne, John. Selections from Knowledge and Lotteries. Lackey, Jennifer. “Acting on Knowledge.” Stanley, Jason. Selections from Knowledge and Practical Interests.
Week 4 – Permissivism vs. Impermissivism
Required Reading Schoenfield, Miriam. “Permission to Believe.”
Strongly Recommended Reading Cohen, Gerald Allan. “Paradoxes of Conviction.”
Optional Further Reading Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” Kelly, Thomas. “Evidence Can Be Permissive.” Sylvan, Kurt. “Illusion of Discretion.” Vavova, Ekaterina. “Irrelevant Influences.” White, Roger. “Epistemic Permissiveness.”
Week 5 – Epistemic Consequentialism vs. Non-Consequentialism
Required Berker, Selim. "The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism."
Optional Further Reading Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, Geoffrey. “A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism.” Berker, Selim. “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.” Firth, Roderick. “Epistemic Merit: Intrinsic and Instrumental.” Fumerton, Richard. “Epistemic Normativity and Justification.” Sylvan, Kurt. “Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.” Sylvan, Kurt. “Veritism Unswamped.”
Week 6 – Virtue Epistemology
Required Reading Sosa, Ernest. Selections from Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge: A Virtue Epistemology. Zagzebski, Linda. Selection from Virtues of the Mind.
Recommended Reading Greco, John and Turri, John. “Virtue Epistemology.” Lackey, Jennifer. “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Zagzebski, Linda. "From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology."
Optional Further Reading Baehr, J. “Character, Reliabilism, and Virtue Epistemology.” Brogaard, Berit. “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?” Code, Lorraine. “Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology.” Miracchi, Lisa. “Competence to Know.” Montmarquet, James. “Epistemic Virtue.” Pritchard, Duncan. “Apt Performance and Epistemic Value.” Riggs, Wayne. “Two Problems of Easy Credit.” Sylvan, Kurt. “Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation.” Sylvan, Kurt and Sosa, Ernest. “The Place of Reasons in Epistemology.” Sylvan, Kurt. “Responsibilism out of Character.”
3. The Applied Ethics of Belief
Week 7 – Epistemic Injustice, Part 1: Fricker and Dotson
Strongly Recommended Reading Anderson, Luvell. “Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Race.” Fricker, Miranda. Further Selections from Epistemic Injustice. Optional Further Reading Anderson, Elizabeth. “Epistemic Injustice as a Virtue of Social Institutions.” Fricker, Miranda. “Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege.” Gendler, Tamar Szabo. “The Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias.” Pohlhaus, Gaile. “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice.” Gougen, Stacey. “Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality.”
Week 8 – Epistemic Injustice, Part 2: The Nature of Prejudice
Required Reading Appiah, Kwame Anthony. "Racisms." Kelly, Daniel and Roedder, Erica. “Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias.”
Optional Further Reading Brownstein, Michael. "Implicit Bias." Gendler, Tamar. "Alief and Belief." Gendler, Tamar. "Alief in Action and Reaction." Greenwald, Anthony and Krieger, L. H. “Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations.” Leslie, Sarah-Jane. "The Original Sin of Cognition." Mandelbaum, Eric. "Against Alief." Mandelbaum, Eric. "Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias." Nagel, Jennifer. "Gendler on Alief." Washington, Natalia and Kelly, Daniel. "Who's Responsible for this? Moral Responsibility and Knowledge of Implicit Bias."
Week 9 – Ideology, Part 1
Required Reading Shelby, Tommie. “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory.”
Optional Further Reading Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” Elster, John. "Belief, Bias, and Ideology." Geuss, Raymond. "Ideology." Haslanger, Sally. “Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements.” Haslanger, Sally. "Ideology Beyond Belief." Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. Selections from The German Ideology. Rosen, Michael. "The Forms of False Consciousness."
Week 10 – Ideology, Part 2
Required Reading Stanley, Jason. Selection from How Propaganda Works.
Optional Further Reading Lippmann, Walter. Selections from Public Opinion. Stanley, Jason. Further selections from How Propaganda Works. Srinivasan, A. "Philosophy and Ideology." Week 11 – Conceptual Ethics
Required Reading Haslanger, Sally. "'But Mom, Crop Tops Are Cute!' Social Knowledge, Social Structure, and Ideology Critique." Haslanger, Sally. Introduction to Resisting Reality.
Strongly Recommended Reading Burgess, Alexis. and Plunkett, David. "Conceptual Ethics." Haslanger, Sally. More from Resisting Reality.
Optional Further Reading Plunkett, David. “Which Concepts Should We Use?” Quine, W. V. O. “Ontology and Ideology.” Sider, Ted. Selections from Writing the Book of the World. Thomasson, Amie. “Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation.” Thomasson, Amie. “What Can We Do, When We Do Metaphysics?”
4. The Meta-Ethics of Belief
Week 12 – The Source of Doxastic Norms
Required Reading Velleman, J. David. "On The Aim of Belief."
Optional Further Reading Enoch, David. “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action.” McHugh, Conor. “Belief and Aims.” Owens, David. “Does Belief Have an Aim?” Railton, Peter. “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Action and Belief.” Railton, Peter. “Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief.” Shah, Nishi. “How Truth Governs Belief.”