I'm an associate professor at the University of Southampton. I finished my PhD at Rutgers in 2014. Ernest Sosa was my advisor and Ruth Chang, Jonathan Dancy, Alvin Goldman, and Susanna Schellenberg were on my committee; you can see a post-defense picture here, complete with a Skype projection on my face. My dissertation was entitled On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality. It sought to explain why we should care about being epistemically rational. My explanation rested on the thought that epistemic rationality constitutes respect for truth (a thought that also figured in my first publication in 2012). This project quickly transformed into a larger one that explains why perspectival obligations have perspective-transcendent significance, by appealing to (i) the idea that all value calls fundamentally for respect, and (ii) the idea that respect is constituted by heeding the demands of perspective. Perhaps unsurprisingly, my oldest research interests are all in epistemology. I have also long had research interests in ethics and philosophy of practical reason. I've taught modules in many other areas, including aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics; indeed, I wanted to be a metaphysician of science as an undergraduate. Much of my research combines my interests in epistemology in the broad sense and ethics, and is best described as work in the ethics of belief(the name of a module I teach). My two latest publications develop key ideas from my dissertation: (1) a paper just published in Philosophical Review developing the first explicit and systematic non-consequentialist ethics of belief, Epistemic Kantianism, and (2) a paper forthcoming in Philosophical Studies which applies similar ideas to the case of practical reason. I'm also starting a book project further developing these ideas.
My work in epistemology in the narrow sense (i.e., the theory of knowledge) is mostly separate from this business, however. For I think epistemology in the narrow sense is non-normative, and really a branch of the philosophy of mind. I defend this view in a recent publication. In work in progress that emerged from a graduate seminar I taught two years ago, I'm developing a descendant of the first account of knowledge considered in the history of philosophy, which has been wrongly overlooked in contemporary epistemology; this view was defended by many figures before the 20th century (including figures in classical Indian epistemology), and in the early 20th century by the forgotten British epistemologist Helen Wodehouse in The Presentation of Reality. According to this account, knowledge is that general factive mental state which, when occurrent, presentsone with a fact, where presentations are quasi-perceptual states. This view partly vindicates Theaetetus's thought that 'knowledge is nothing but perception'. But the perception at issue is intellectual rather than sensory, in line with Plato's view about knowledge (which was clearly not a version of JTB).*
* Note that I and others in this tradition cover inferential knowledge by allowing for secondary seeings of truth, of roughly the sort discussed in Dretske's Seeing and Knowing. Inferential knowledge is indirect in one way (the seeing is secondary) but direct in a more important way (the seeing is seeing). As for testimonial knowledge (in contrast to testimonially justified true belief), I think Reid got it right when he emphasized the 'striking analogy' between the testimony of persons and the testimony of the senses, and in effect suggested that we can secondarily hear truths through a trustworthy speaker's words.