PAPERS OUT IN JOURNALS AND BOOKS

"Veritism Unswamped."  Mind, 2018.
"Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation."  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018.
"The Place of Reasons in Epistemology" (with Ernest Sosa).  In Star, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, 2018.
''Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?''  Synthese, 2017.
"Responsibilism out of Character."  In Alfano, M. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Epistemic Situationism (OUP), 2017.
"Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons" (with Daniel Fogal).  In Ichikawa, J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, 2017.
"Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity."  Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"Epistemic Reasons II: Basing."  Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"The Illusion of Discretion."  Synthese, 2016.
"Skorupski on Spontaneity, Apriority, and Normative Truth."  Philosophical Quarterly, 2016.   (Reply by Skorupski here.)
"What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be."  Philosophical Studies, 2015.
"Truth Monism without Teleology."  Thought, 2012. ​
"How to Be a Redundant Realist."  Episteme, 2012.  ​(Reply by List and Pettit here.)

FORTHCOMING PAPERS

"Believing for Normative Reasons: Prime, Not Composite" (with Errol Lord).  Forthcoming in Bondy, P. and Carter, A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation.  London: Routledge.
"Subjective Reasons and their Normativity."  Forthcoming in Chang, R. and Sylvan, K. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.  London: Routledge.

ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES

"Reasons in Epistemology."  Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2014.

REVIEWS
​
Hirose, I. and Olson, E. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (with Errol Lord).  Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016.
Flanagan, O. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue.  Forthcoming in Analysis​.
Star, D.  Knowing Better.  Forthcoming in The Journal of Moral Philosophy.