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PAPERS
"Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism." Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
"Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons." Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
"Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat" (with Errol Lord). Forthcoming in Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat, Oxford University Press.
"Responsibilism within Reason." Forthcoming in Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.) Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
"An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism." Philosophical Review, 2020.
"Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)" (with Errol Lord). In Bondy, P. and Carter, A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge, 2020.
"Epistemic Consequentialism and its Aftermath." Analysis, 2019.
"Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental" (with Errol Lord) The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2019.
"Veritism Unswamped." Mind, 2018.
"Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018.
"The Place of Reasons in Epistemology" (with Ernest Sosa). In Star, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, 2018.
''Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?'' Synthese, 2017.
"Responsibilism out of Character." In Alfano, M. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Epistemic Situationism (OUP), 2017.
"Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons" (with Daniel Fogal). In Ichikawa, J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, 2017.
"Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity." Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"Epistemic Reasons II: Basing." Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"The Illusion of Discretion." Synthese, 2016.
"Skorupski on Spontaneity, Apriority, and Normative Truth." Philosophical Quarterly, 2016. (Reply by Skorupski here.)
"What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be." Philosophical Studies, 2015.
"How to Be a Redundant Realist." Episteme, 2012. (Reply by List and Pettit here.)
"Truth Monism without Teleology." Thought, 2012.
REVIEWS
Star, D. Knowing Better. The Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2019.
Chartier, G. The Logic of Commitment. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2018.
Flanagan, O. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Analysis, 2017.
Hirose, I. and Olson, E. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (with Errol Lord). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
'Reasons in Epistemology'. First version: Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2014; old copy available here. The entry is being updated in light of new work. I also have another one in the works on foundationalism, to be posted within a few months.
"Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism." Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
"Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons." Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
"Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat" (with Errol Lord). Forthcoming in Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat, Oxford University Press.
"Responsibilism within Reason." Forthcoming in Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.) Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
"An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism." Philosophical Review, 2020.
"Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)" (with Errol Lord). In Bondy, P. and Carter, A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge, 2020.
"Epistemic Consequentialism and its Aftermath." Analysis, 2019.
"Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental" (with Errol Lord) The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2019.
"Veritism Unswamped." Mind, 2018.
"Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018.
"The Place of Reasons in Epistemology" (with Ernest Sosa). In Star, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, 2018.
''Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?'' Synthese, 2017.
"Responsibilism out of Character." In Alfano, M. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Epistemic Situationism (OUP), 2017.
"Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons" (with Daniel Fogal). In Ichikawa, J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, 2017.
"Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity." Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"Epistemic Reasons II: Basing." Philosophy Compass, 2016.
"The Illusion of Discretion." Synthese, 2016.
"Skorupski on Spontaneity, Apriority, and Normative Truth." Philosophical Quarterly, 2016. (Reply by Skorupski here.)
"What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be." Philosophical Studies, 2015.
"How to Be a Redundant Realist." Episteme, 2012. (Reply by List and Pettit here.)
"Truth Monism without Teleology." Thought, 2012.
REVIEWS
Star, D. Knowing Better. The Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2019.
Chartier, G. The Logic of Commitment. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2018.
Flanagan, O. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Analysis, 2017.
Hirose, I. and Olson, E. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (with Errol Lord). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
'Reasons in Epistemology'. First version: Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2014; old copy available here. The entry is being updated in light of new work. I also have another one in the works on foundationalism, to be posted within a few months.