Meets Tuesdays from 2-3 in 44/1057 and Wednesdays from 9-11 in 54/5027
SCHEDULE OF READINGS
For each week, the readings mainly divide into required and optional further readings. I include the optional readings just in case you find the topic especially interesting and would like to write a paper on it or simply learn more.
Note that a great many of the readings can be found online (see links for use when connected to campus internet), and also in Epistemology: An Anthology(eds. Sosa, Kim, Fantl and McGrath).
Part 1. Individual Epistemology
Unit A. The Analysis of Knowledge (Three Weeks)
Week 1: The Gettier Problem and Attempted Solutions in the 60s-70s
Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews Appiah, A. 2003. Thinking It Through, Chapter 2. Oxford University Press. Fumerton, R. 2006. Epistemology, Ch. 3. Wiley-Blackwell. Ichikawa, J. and Steup, M. 2012. “The Analysis of Knowledge.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Pritchard, D. 2006. What Is This Thing Called ‘Knowledge’?, Chs. 1 & 3. Routledge. Sosa, E. 2017. Epistemology, Ch. 4. Princeton University Press. Zagzebski, L. 2009. Selection from On Epistemology. Wadsworth.
Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts Clark, M. 1963. "Knowledge and Grounds." Analysis 24: 46-48. Goldman, A. 1967. “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Journal of Philosophy 64: 357-372. Harman, G. 1973. Selections from Thought. Princeton University Press. Klein, P. 1976. “Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility.” Journal of Philosophy 73: 792-812. Lehrer, K. and Paxson, T. 1969. “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.” Journal of Philosophy66: 225-237. Lycan, W. 2006. “The Gettier Problem Problem” in Hetherington, S. (ed.) Epistemology Futures. OUP. Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits, Introduction and Chapter 1. OUP.
Week 2: The Search for a Solution, Continued: Knowledge and Counterfactuals
Strongly Recommended Reading Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations, Ch. 3, Parts I and II. Harvard University Press. Roush, Sherrilyn. 2005. Tracking Truth, Chs.1-2. Oxford University Press. Sosa, Ernest. 1999. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 137-49.
Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews Pritchard, D. 2006. What Is This Thing Called ‘Knowledge’?, Ch. 12. Routledge. Sosa, E. 2017. Epistemology, Ch. 2. Princeton University Press.
Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts Briggs, R. and Nolan, D. 2012. “Mad, Bad, and Dangerous to Know.” Analysis 72: 314-316. Briggs, R. and Nolan, D. 2012. “Epistemic Dispositions.” Logos & Episteme3: 629-636. Kripke, S. “Nozick on Knowledge”
Week 3: Sosa's Solution
Required Reading Sosa, Ernest. Selections from Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1.
Strongly Recommended Reading Lackey, Jennifer. 2007. “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Synthese 158: 345-361. Sosa, E. 2017. Epistemology, Selection. Princeton University Press.
Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews Pritchard, D. Selections from What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? Zagzebski, L. Selection from On Epistemology.
Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts Brogaard, B. 2006. “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?” Canadian J. Phil. 36: 335-354. Greco, J. Selection from Achieving Knowledge. Pritchard, D. 2009. “Apt Performance and Epistemic Value.” Philosophical Studies 143: 407-416. Turri, J. 2011. “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.” Philosophers Imprint11(8).
Unit B. The Structure of Justification (Three Weeks)
Week 4: Introduction to Foundationalism vs. Coherentism vs. Infinitism
Required Reading Hasan, Ali and Fumerton, Richard. 2016. “Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification” SEP. Siegel, Susanna. 2013. “The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience.” Phil. Studies. 162: 697-722.
Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews Dancy, J. Selection from Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Fumerton, R. Selection from Epistemology Pritchard, D. Selection from What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? Zagzebski, L. Selection from On Epistemology
Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts Alston, W. 1976. “Two Types of Foundationalism.” Journal of Philosophy 73: 165-185. Alston, W. 1976. “Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?" Philosophical Studies 29: 287-305. Bergmann, M. 2004. “What’s Not Wrong with Foundationalism.” PPR 68: 161-165. Klein, P. 1999. “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.” Phil. Perspectives 13: 297-325. Lyons, J. 2008. “Evidence, Experience, and Externalism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86: 461-479. Pryor, J. 2005. “There Is Immediate Justification” in Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. Sosa, E. 1980. “The Raft and the Pyramid.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy5: 3-26.
Week 5: Siegel on the Evaluation of Experience, Continued
Required Reading Siegel, Susanna. 2017. Selections from The Rationality of Perception. Oxford University Press.
Optional Further Reading Siegel, Susanna. 2017. Further selections from The Rationality of Perception. Oxford University Press.
Week 6: Moderate Coherentism and Haack's Hybrid View
Required Reading Haack, Susan. “A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification.”
Strongly Recommended Elgin, Catherine. 2005. “Non-Foundationalist Epistemology” in Steup, M. and Sosa, E.(eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. Poston, Ted. 2012. “Basic Reasons and First Philosophy...” Southern J. Phil. 50: 75-93.
Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews Dancy, J. Selection from Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts BonJour, L. 1997. “Haack on Justification and Experience.” Synthese 112: 13-23. Haack, S. 1997. “Reply to BonJour.” Synthese 112: 25-35. McGrew, L. and McGrew, T. 2008. “Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support.” Erkenntnis 68: 55-77. Tramel, P. 2008. “Haack’s Foundherentism is a Foundationalism.” Synthese 160: 215–228.
Unit C. Internalism vs. Externalism (Two Weeks)
Week 7: Questioning the Motivations for Internalim
Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews Fumerton, R. Selection from Epistemology. Poston, T. “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Pritchard, D. Selection from What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?
Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts Bergmann, M. Selections from Justification without Awareness. Conee, E. and Feldman, R. “Internalism Defended” Feldman, R. “Justification Is Internal" Goldman, A. “Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification.” Journal of Philosophy106: 309-338. Greco, J. “Justification Is Not Internal” Sosa, E. Selections from Epistemic Justification. Srinivasan, Amia. “Normativity without Cartesian Privilege.” Philosophical Issues 25: 273-299.
Week 8: Externalism - Goldman's Reliabilism
Required Reading Goldman, Alvin. 1979. “What Is Justified Belief?” in Pappas, G. (ed.) Justification and Knowledge. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Strongly Recommended Reading Zagzebski, Linda. 1999. “From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology.” Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy 5:173-179.
Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews Goldman, A. and Beddor, B. 2015. “Reliabilist Epistemology” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts BonJour, L. 1980. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 53–74. Cohen, S. 1984. “Justification and Truth.” Philosophical Studies46: 279-95. Conee, E and Feldman, R. 1998. “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism.” Philosophical Studies 89: 1-29. Fricker, E. “Unreliable Testimony” Fumerton, R. Selection from Metaepistemology and Skepticism Goldman, A. Selections from Epistemology and Cognition Goldman, A. and Olson, E. “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge” Haack, S. “The Evidence against Reliabilism”
Part 2. Social Epistemology
Unit A. Testimony and Epistemic Injustice
Week 9: Lackey on the Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate
Strongly Recommended Reading Lackey, Jennifer. Introduction to The Epistemology of Testimony.
Optional Further Reading: Introductory Texts and Overviews Adler, J. 2012. “Epistemological Problems of Testimony.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Pritchard, D. Selection from What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? Zagzebski, L. Selection from On Epistemology
Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts Burge, T. 1993. “Content Preservation." Philosophical Review 102: 457-488. Coady, C. A. J. Testimony: A Philosophical Study Faulkner, P. “The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge” Fricker, E. 1994. “Against Gullibility" in Chakrabarti, A. & Matilal, B. K. (eds.) Knowing from Words. Kluwer. Fricker, E. 2006. "Second-Hand Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 592-618. Goldberg, S. "Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimony" Lackey, J. “It Takes Two to Tango” Lackey, J. Selection from Learning from Words. Moran, R. 2005. “Getting Told and Being Believed.” Philosophers' Imprint 5. Sosa, E. "Knowledge: Instrumental and Testimonial."
Week 10: Epistemic Injustice
Required Reading Fricker, Miranda. 2003. “Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing.” Metaphilosophy 34: 154–173
Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts Alcoff, L. 2010. “Epistemic Identities.” Episteme 7: 128-137. Anderson, E. 2012. “Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions.” Social Epistemology 26: 163-173. Anderson, L. “Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Race” Dotson, K. “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing” Dotson, K. “A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression” Fricker, M. Selections from Epistemic Injustice Fricker, M. “Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology”
Unit B. Standpoint Epistemologies
Week 11: Anderson and Mills
Required Reading Anderson, Elizabeth. “Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and Defense” Mills, Charles. “Alternative Epistemologies"
Optional Further Reading: Primary Texts Antony, L. “Quine as Feminist: The Radical Import of Naturalized Epistemology” Collins, P. H. “Black Feminist Epistemology” Fricker, Miranda. “Feminism in Epistemology: Pluralism without Postmodernism” Harding, S. “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is Strong Objectivity?” Harding, S. Selections from The Science Question in Feminism. Hartsock, N. "The Feminist Standpoint." Haslanger, S. "What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be" Mills, C. “White Ignorance” Smith, D. Selections from The Everyday World as Problematic.