

Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons

Abstract

Some say that rationality only requires us to respond to *apparent* normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. The existence of these duties of respect, I argue, ensures that apparent moral reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. I then extend these arguments to the domain of overall reason. Just as there are duties of respect for moral reasons that explain moral blameworthiness, so there are duties of respect for reasons (period) that explain blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. The existence of these duties ensures that apparent reasons (period) are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. The result is a vindication of the normativity of rationality.

1 Introduction

On a familiar view in meta-ethics, rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons, not normative reasons *per se*.¹ The popularity of this view owes partly to a view about normative reasons on which they are, in the first instance, facts that count in favor of acts and attitudes. Given this view about reasons, it is natural to think that one can fail to be in a position to appreciate the reasons or the normative relations that they bear to one's acts or attitudes while remaining fully rational. If there is any obvious connection between rationality and normative reasons on this sort of view, it is indirect: one is rational only if one responds correctly to the normative reasons that appear to exist from one's perspective.

So understood, rationality has two aspects worth separating. On the one hand, rationality requires us not to ignore our beliefs about what there is reason to think, do, or feel. This dimension of rationality is captured by a class of coherence requirements that includes:

Enkrasia: Rationality requires one to ϕ if one thinks there is decisive reason to ϕ .²

¹ The view goes back to Scanlon (1998) and is endorsed by many others, including Broome (2007), Dancy (2000), Kolodny (2005), Parfit (2001), Raz (2011), and Schroeder (2009). "Apparent reason" is Parfit's term.

² "Enkrasia" is Broome's term. In the literature, people often discuss this simple version of Enkrasia but recognize that the requirement ultimately needs to be formulated in a more complicated way to be plausible. Broome has a much more complicated formulation; see Broome (2013). For these introductory purposes, I set aside the question of how best to formulate the true principle.

There are other norms related to Enkrasia (as stated) that fall within the scope of my discussion. Enkrasia focuses on cases in which one thinks there are *decisive* reasons to ϕ . But non-decisive rational

While the recent literature focuses heavily on such requirements, we can hold that rationality calls for more than coherence even if we agree that it calls for less than correctness. Some apparent reasons are generated by appearances of a non-doxastic kind. If it looks like there is a red-hot coil on the stove, then there is *prima facie* rational pressure not to thrust your hand onto the stove. The pressure is not weaker if the appearance is misleading (unbeknownst to you), nor if you lack the explicit belief that there is decisive reason not to burn yourself.

Extending a familiar idiom, I will call the rational pressures exerted by our *de dicto* beliefs about reasons *structural apparent reasons* and the rational pressures exerted by other appearances *substantive apparent reasons*. While these rational pressures are worth distinguishing, they have something in common: they depend on *how things appear to us*. Because appearances can deceive, a question arises: do we necessarily gain a real reason to ϕ if there is an apparent reason to ϕ ?

It is unclear why this would be so. It is not true in general that apparent Fs are real Fs. So why think that apparent reasons are necessarily real reasons or even necessarily generate real reasons? Sure, they line up with real reasons in many actual cases. In our world, there is a real reason not to thrust your hand onto the stove in the sort of case described earlier: appearances of red-hot coils reliably indicate the presence of red-hot coils. But it is not a necessary truth that perceptual appearances are reliable indicators of the facts. And so it is unclear why apparent reasons would *necessarily* be real reasons.

Failing to see an optimistic answer to our question, many conclude that apparent reasons are no exception to the thought that apparent Fs need not be real Fs.³ On this view, rational pressures do not necessarily provide real reasons.

While this view is tempting, it leaves us with a puzzle. Even from a third-person point of view, it looks like a mistake for someone to ϕ when she has decisive apparent reasons not to ϕ . It is not a merely apparent mistake, one might think. But if apparent reasons are not necessarily real reasons, it would seem not necessarily to be a real mistake. If there was no real case against ϕ -ing, how could it have been a mistake to ϕ ? We can continue to call it a “mistake of rationality” even if it is not a real mistake, just as we can call mistakes of etiquette “mistakes of etiquette” even knowing that they are often not real mistakes. But that merely gives us another way to describe the puzzle.

The puzzle, then, is simple. If we accept the tempting view that apparent reasons are not necessarily real reasons, we cannot obviously explain why mistakes of rationality are real mistakes. But if we reject the tempting view, we face an explanatory burden: we must explain what is special about apparent reasons that makes them exceptions to the thought that apparent Fs need not be real Fs.

One might try to find a way between the horns of this dilemma. There is a familiar strategy when it comes to the rational pressure exerted by normative

pressures could be generated by other normative beliefs. Indeed, any reason that one takes oneself to have that one does not take to be *undercut* is an apparent reason that one is rationally pressured to take into account. Some (e.g., Fogal (MS)) conclude that it is wrong to focus on requirements in the first instance. I am not sure about that conclusion, but to sidestep controversy, I will talk about “rational pressures” in what follows.

³ See e.g. Scanlon (1998), Kolodny (2005), Raz (2005), Parfit (2011), and Broome (2013).

beliefs.⁴ One can try to understand the requirement to ϕ if one believes that there is decisive reason to ϕ in a wide-scope way:

Enkrasia-Wide: Rationality requires that [if one thinks there is decisive reason to ϕ , one ϕ s].

We can hold that failing to comply with *this* requirement is a mistake even if the belief is false. For one can comply with this requirement in two ways: by revising the belief or by ϕ -ing. One might then hope that this proposal will generalize.

Questions remain, however. A question that has been at the center of the debate about the normativity of rationality is what the reasons for complying with requirements like *Enkrasia-Wide* would be. The wide-scope approach does not answer this question by itself. By itself, the approach merely shows us how to avoid bootstrapping. Sure, bootstrapping was perhaps the only reason for thinking that rational requirements *couldn't* be normative. But to vindicate the normativity of rationality, it is not enough to show that it is false that rationality couldn't be normative. One also has to give a story about why there is reason to be rational. And the most prominent wide-scooper confesses that he is unable to find reasons that would explain the force that rational requirements appear to have.⁵ So, while wide-scoping might abate the problem, it does not solve it.

There are other reasons to doubt that wide-scoping addresses the fundamental problem. Not all appearances are doxastic. It might appear to one that there is decisive reason to ϕ before one has formed the belief that there is decisive reason to ϕ .⁶ Such appearances can generate rational pressure: if it non-doxastically appears that there is decisive reason to ϕ and it does not appear that there are reasons to mistrust that appearance, then there is rational pressure to ϕ . But one cannot drop the appearance that there is decisive reason to ϕ through reasoning in the way that one can drop the belief that there is decisive reason to ϕ through reasoning. If so, this rational pressure looks like a narrow scope kind of pressure.⁷

Yet there is no less reason to think that non-doxastic appearances can be misleading than to think that beliefs can be false. Such appearances fall within the scope of the remarks that generate our puzzle. One might say that these appearances exert a different kind of rational pressure than that exerted by beliefs. But that fact would just show that our puzzle is more general than many assume.

For these reasons, I will assume that wide-scoping does not solve the fundamental puzzle. For one thing, wide-scoping gives us no story about what the reasons for being rational would be, and indeed is consistent with skepticism about the normativity of rationality. For another thing, the fundamental problem is not just

⁴ See Broome (1999).

⁵ See Broome (2005, 2008, 2013).

⁶ Huemer (2007) is a big source of the idea that non-doxastic appearances extend beyond the perceptual case. The idea is also found in the literature on intuitions; cf. Bengson (forthcoming).

⁷ Here I rely on a weak version of what Kolodny (2005) calls the "Reasoning Test". All that my version assumes is that if a rational requirement governing a conflict between states A and B is wide-scope, then it is psychologically possible to reason one's way out of the conflict by dropping A or by dropping B. I do not assume—as I think Kolodny wrongly assumes—that one has to be able to reason from B to dropping A and from A to dropping B.

a problem about coherence requirements. It is a broader problem about the normativity of apparent reasons. I will not be assuming that wide-scoping fails to capture the form of coherence requirements. Indeed, I think the positive view I will ultimately defend explains why there is reason for us to comply with wide-scope coherence requirements. I only set aside wide-scoping as affording by itself a solution to the fundamental puzzle about the normativity of rationality.

How can we solve this puzzle? Most contributors to the literature take it for granted that apparent reasons are not necessarily real reasons, though some have recently held that apparent reasons are normatively significant in virtue of determining what we ought to do in the deliberative sense of “ought”.⁸ More familiar responses are to (i) tell an error theory, (ii) give an account of the reasons for satisfying wide-scope requirements, or (iii) mimic Prichard on the normativity of morality and hold that there are reasons to be rational without giving an explanation that appeals to reasons from another domain.⁹ I am not satisfied with these proposals. But rather than argue against them, I want to pursue a kind of alternative that has been ignored. This alternative simply maintains that having an apparent reason to ϕ does necessarily give one a real reason to ϕ , and sets out to explain how this is possible.

My account of how this is possible is the *Respect for Reasons Account*. It says that the problem with someone who is irrational is that this person violates an objective duty of respect for reasons. To develop this account, I begin in §2 with a point that I exploit throughout. Whenever a source of reasons calls for respect,¹⁰ we find an exception to the idea that having an apparent reason to ϕ does not guarantee having a real reason to ϕ . Specifically, for any source of reasons X that calls for respect, if ψ -ing would violate a duty one has to X, then if it appears that by ϕ -ing one would be ψ -ing, one’s intentionally ϕ -ing would violate the duty of respect for X (other things being equal).¹¹ This is because intentionally doing what appears to violate your duties to X is a paradigmatic way to manifest disrespect for X.

⁸ This is in effect Ross (2012)’s view. For discussion of the deliberative “ought”, see Kiesewetter (2011). Schroeder (2008) uses subjective reasons to explain rationality, but he does not make the further claim that they explain what we ought to do in the deliberative sense. So he does not address the normativity problem. Kolodny (2005) agrees that what we ought rationally to do is what we ought to do in a subjective sense.

⁹ Kolodny (2005, 2008a–c) and Raz (2005) pursue option (i). Southwood (2008) and Hussain (MS) pursue option (iii). Many have pursued option (ii), but most give stories for particular coherence requirements rather than giving a general theory for all rational requirements. Bratman (2009) gives an account of the reason to comply with the wide-scope instrumental principle, while Reisner (2011) gives an account of the reasons to comply with epistemic coherence requirements.

¹⁰ Note that if we take reasons to be things that stand in reason-for relations, there is a way in which it is true that reasons are sources of reasons. They just are reason-giving facts. Because I understand reasons that way, I will shift between talking about reasons and sources of reasons.

¹¹ I use this formulation because the point does not turn on one’s representing ϕ -ing as *duty-violating*.

The “other things being equal” is meant to fill in for whatever other conditions might be necessary for the duty to be an apparent duty. On sophisticated accounts of apparent reasons like Vogelstein (2012)’s and Whiting (2013)’s, it is not enough for an apparent fact to be an apparent reason to ϕ that this fact would, if it obtained, give one a reason to ϕ . The fact that there are other necessary conditions indicates that we would have to consult the true theory of apparent reasons to remove the “other things being equal”.

With these ideas in place, I defend a more ambitious claim in §3: whenever one fails to respond rationally to apparent reasons, one is violating a duty of respect for reasons. This is because failures to respond to the apparent reasons will involve doing what, if the appearances were veridical, would amount to failures to respond to the reasons. And such failures are incompatible, I argue, with manifesting respect for reasons. From this and the preliminary points made in §2, it will follow that appearances of reasons provide genuine reasons. And these are serious reasons, since they are explained by duties of respect.

One might wonder what exactly this duty of respect for reasons involves and where it comes from. Anticipating these questions, I spend time in §2 unpacking the notion of respect in a way that stymies the worry that it is merely fetishistic. Following Graham (2014), I will suggest that respect for morally relevant factors (understood *de re*) is a requirement we already have reason to accept as a ground of moral blameworthiness. In positing a duty of respect for reasons, I generalize this suggestion to the domain of overall reason: the duty of respect for reasons is the duty we violate whenever we are blameworthy in the court of overall reason.

The upshot is that the objective duty of respect explains why there is objective reason to comply with requirements of substantive rationality. I give a similar argument that failing to respond to structural apparent reasons constitutes violation of an objective duty of commitment to reasons-responsiveness, which I formulate to avoid worries about fetishism and rational akrasia. This duty explains the normativity of (enkratic) structural rationality. So two norms explain the normativity of rationality: a norm of respect underpins the normativity of substantive rationality (§3), and a norm of commitment underpins the normativity of (enkratic) structural rationality (§4). One might worry that these norms conflict. But I argue in §5 that they do not.

It is compatible with this story that there can be reasons outside a rational agent's ken to which she can fail to conform. But as I explain in §6, if this were true, my view would not predict that we face any incredible dilemma. Competing duties can issue from a single locus. Some values are both fittingly respected and promoted, and respect and promotion can conflict. One might wonder, though: if the pressure to conform to all the reasons outweighed the pressure to manifest respect for reasons, would it follow that the requirements of rationality lack *stringency*? Not, I argue in §6, any sort of stringency that anyone should have ever demanded of rational requirements. After addressing some other objections, I draw things to a close by taking stock of the main points and how my account meets every constraint that we can reasonably demand of an account.

2 Respect, Obligation, and the Appearances

To warm up to my general account, I will begin by arguing in this section that there is a kind of reason in the moral case for which the following thesis holds:

Weak Transparency—Substantive: Necessarily, if one has a substantive apparent reason of this kind to ϕ , then one has an objective reason of this kind to ϕ .

My defense of this thesis will turn on a fact about respect. For any X that calls for respect, if ψ -ing would violate a duty one has to X, then if it appears that by ϕ -ing one would be ψ -ing, one's intentionally ϕ -ing would violate the duty of respect for X. So, if one has that kind of apparent reason not to perform that act, one has a real reason not to perform the act. And the reason is a serious one, since it is explained by a duty of respect.

Notice that I am not claiming that if it appears to one that some act would violate a duty one has towards X, then intentionally performing that act would violate *that very duty*. One could call that false claim *Strong Transparency*. The claim I defend is that there is always a real duty that one would violate if one intentionally performed an apparent duty-violating act: viz., a duty of respect.

Using a similar strategy to the one used to support Weak Transparency—Substantive, I will also argue that there is a kind of reason in the moral case for which the following holds:

Weak Transparency—Structural: Necessarily, if one has a structural apparent reason of this kind to ϕ , then one has an objective reason of this kind to ϕ .

This thesis requires separate treatment, since my strategy for vindicating it raises issues that do not arise in the case of Weak Transparency—Substantive.

2.1 Respect and the Appearances

Let's consider some examples. Our relationships with others call for respect. They call for other things too, which vary depending on the type of relationship. Suppose you have agreed to have a monogamous relationship with Kris. And suppose that the fact that you agreed to be in this relationship makes it the case that you have a duty not to become romantically involved with other people. The crucial thing to notice is that if you intentionally do what appears to violate this duty, you violate a further duty: you fail to manifest the kind of respect for your relationship (and for Kris) that your relationship (and Kris) demand.

To see why this is plausible, consider a case in which it misleadingly appears that you are becoming romantically involved with someone other than Kris:

Disguise: Kris worries that you would cheat if you had the chance. Kris decides to test this hypothesis. With the help of an acting background and some remarkable costuming skills, Kris manages to dress up like a totally different person on whom you would have an instant crush. So disguised, Kris has been showing up at coffee shops around your workplace to flirt with you. You are convinced that you are interacting with someone other than Kris. You now seem to be having a date with this person when Kris allegedly planned to be out of town.

Suppose Kris reveals the truth to you and claims that you manifest shocking disrespect for your relationship. The following would not be a compelling reply: "On the contrary, I manifest full respect: it is *you*, after all, with whom I am having this date!" This reply is implausible not because you are actually cheating, but rather because you are violating a further duty of respect.

We underdescribe this case if we just say that you did something subjectively wrong. Of course, you did not really violate your duty not to become romantically involved with other people. But you did violate a duty with the same source. Your plans and acts manifested disrespect for your relationship and for Kris. You *objectively* ought not to manifest such disrespect. The value—the actual value—of your relationship calls for such respect. This case illustrates how the apparent violation of one duty can constitute a real violation of another duty. And so it shows that for one kind of reason, having an apparent reason of that kind entails having an objective reason of that kind.

While the duty of respect has its source in actual value and it is not a merely subjective duty, it imposes a constraint on your subjectivity. You cannot manifest respect for a relationship in virtue of intentionally doing what appears to violate the terms of that relationship. Conversely for disrespect: would it cast doubt on your loyalty if you had a date with someone who managed to look and act just like Kris, and whom you took on this basis to be Kris? No. If Kris were unaware that the person with whom you had the date was dressed up this way, Kris could demand an explanation. But you *could* show there was no failure of respect.

This observation is not confined to intimate relationships. Other relationships—the relationship of promiser to promisee, testifier to recipient, or professional to professional—call for the sort of respect that underpins our observation. Suppose you promised Zane that you will ϕ by April. And suppose that it is now January and you misremember: you mistakenly seem to recall promising that you would ϕ by February. It turns out that you wrote this mistake into your calendar. So you are sure that you promised to ϕ by February. If you now make plans to do something incompatible with ϕ -ing by February and say to yourself, “It isn’t that important, whatever Zane thinks. I’ll do it by April,” you manifest disrespect for Zane and the constraints his promises impose. If Zane overheard you, he could complain, even though he realizes that your plans are compatible with the promise actually made.

Similar points can be made in the case of testimony. Although the recipient of testimony wants truth or knowledge, it does not follow that the recipient has nothing to complain about if she receives nothing but truth or knowledge. Even if I realize that a testifier always speaks the truth about some domain, I have something to complain about if the testifier takes himself to be speaking falsely to me. We care about honesty even if we realize that we will get the truth anyway. Why? Because there is, yet again, a norm of respect in play.

The observation is not even confined to relationships. Legitimate rules call not only for conformity but for respect. A person might conform to a rule but do so in spite of being reckless or negligent with respect to it. When we fault this person for recklessness or negligence, what we are faulting them for is for manifesting insufficient respect for the rule. That is a real mistake. These observations suggest that when a person has apparent reason relative to some rule to intend to ϕ , then insofar as that rule is normative, she also has real reason to intend to ϕ : failure to intend to ϕ would manifest disrespect for the rule.

So there is a kind of objective reason one cannot appear to have without having

a reason of that kind. Of course, there is room for a more specific kind of fallibility. It is false that if it appears to us that we are cheating on our partners, breaking our promises, speaking falsely, or violating some principles, we are thereby engaging in *these* violations of our duties to partners, promisees, interlocutors, and principles. But it does not follow that we are not thereby violating *other* duties.

This point is often overlooked in discussions of the relationship between blameworthiness and wrongness, with the recent exception of Graham (2014). Excusable wrongdoing is of course possible, and it is true that one can be blameworthy in doing something permissible.¹² But it does not follow that all norms can be blamelessly violated or that there is no norm one violates when one is blameworthy in performing a permissible act. The norm one violates is a norm of respect. And norms of respect cannot be blamelessly violated.

2.2 The Nature and Objects of Respect

How should we understand the relevant sort of respect? It is not appraisal respect: it is not as if legitimate rules call for esteem. And it need not be second-personal: it is something that one can have with respect to a legitimate rule. It is something close to the broader sort of recognition respect Darwall (1977) had in mind, though I hesitate to use the term because he uses it second-personally in his more recent work.¹³ Darwall originally glossed it as follows: “There is a kind of respect which can have any of a number of different sorts of things as its object and which consists, most generally, in a disposition to weigh appropriately in one’s deliberations some feature of the thing in question and to act accordingly.”¹⁴ This gloss is not entirely helpful: what is it to weigh the feature *appropriately*?

It is, our examples suggest, to weigh it in the way that the appearances suggest (*de re*) to be the right way. More precisely, I suggest the following specification of the conditions under which one manifests respect for a source of reasons:

Manifesting Respect. S manifests respect for a source of reasons R iff S complies with the substantive apparent reasons apparently given by R.

This is not intended to be an analysis but rather a specification of the conditions under which one manifests respect. To *have* respect for a source of reasons might then be regarded as having the disposition to *manifest* respect for that source of reasons.

We have seen that this sort of respect can take partners, promisees and interlocutors as objects. These objects of respect are denizens of concrete reality. Still, not every claim of the form “S manifests respect for X-es” entails a claim of the form “There exist some X-es for which S manifests respect”. Even if all non-human animals vanished from the face of the earth, one person might manifest a disrespect for non-human animals that the other does not. Suppose that Audrey and Blanche are unaware that all non-human animals have vanished from the face of

¹² The latter is more controversial than the former. For a defense of the idea that one can be blameworthy in doing something permissible, see Zimmerman (1997).

¹³ Esp. Darwall (2006).

¹⁴ Darwall (1977: 38).

the earth, and that there are holograms of cats designed to trick them into thinking that some animals remain. Imagine now that Audrey sees a hologram of some cat being bashed and thinks a real cat is being bashed. If Audrey rejoices, we ought to resent her. What for? Plausibly, for the disrespect for animals she manifests. If, by contrast, Blanche seemed to see that she could easily prevent a cat from being bashed and aimed to do so, she would manifest respect. It is hard to see why Audrey would be less blameworthy for her response or Blanche less praiseworthy for her response than if real cats were involved.

Does it follow that the requirements of respect that fundamentally underpin blameworthiness are more abstract than the surface attributions suggest even when relevant concreta exist? It is tempting to say “yes”, though one might question the general principle behind this temptation, as disjunctivists in the philosophy of perception do. More cautiously, we can say that even if we are required to respect the relevant concreta when they exist, it does not follow that we lack an equally strong duty of respect when these concreta are missing. We have such duties, and this fact explains why Audrey is blameworthy and Blanche is not. Is it fetishistic to believe in this duty of respect? No. It must be in place to explain the full range of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness facts. If avoiding such disrespect were no duty, it is unclear why Audrey would be blameworthy.

Such a norm would be fetishistic only if it got in the way of our caring about concreta. But we are not forced to think that it does. By analogy, we are not forced to think that experience gets in the way of our seeing things if we grant that we would have the same experience when hallucinating. Disjunctivists may disagree, but they are not obviously right. Just as we see things in normal cases partly by being in a state we could be in even when hallucinating on non-disjunctive views, so we manifest respect for concreta in normal cases partly by being in a state that we could be in even when hallucinating these concreta. Respect for non-human animals does not get in the way of caring about particular animals even if it supervenes on the internal, just as experience does not get in the way of seeing particular animals even if it supervenes on the internal.

2.3 Commitment and Normative Appearances

So far we have been discussing a kind of respect that one can seemingly manifest even in the absence of any relevant normative beliefs. Audrey manifests disrespect for non-human animals even if she lacks the belief that her reaction is wrong, and Blanche manifests respect even if she lacks the belief that her response is right. Our picture of respect respects this fact: substantive apparent reasons are not *de dicto* appearances of reasons. Still, one might think that there is something problematic about believing that one has a duty to ϕ and failing to ϕ . What norm could explain that? Is there another norm that enjoins *de dicto* care?

2.3.1 Praiseworthy Akrasia?

Let’s back up. Answering these questions requires care because there are famous views on which one’s responsiveness to normative beliefs in ϕ -ing has little or no

impact on one's praiseworthiness or blameworthiness in ϕ -ing. Arpaly (2003) defended such a view. There are also well-known claims to the effect that *de dicto* concern for rightness is fetishistic. Smith (1994) made this claim. I agree with some existing responses to Arpaly and Smith. I will briefly discuss them to bring into focus the norm that answers our questions.

Recall one of Arpaly's arguments that acting against one's normative beliefs is not necessarily blameworthy. Huck thinks that turning Jim in is the right thing and feels pangs of conscience when he remains loyal to Jim. His decision not to turn Jim in seems praiseworthy when understood not merely as a manifestation of squeamishness but rather as a manifestation of genuine sympathy. Yet Huck acts against his explicit belief that it is wrong to do so, and so allegedly acts akratically. Notably, Arpaly describes Huck as undergoing a "perceptual shift" in the time he spends with Jim, and as manifesting a "visceral egalitarianism".

This case may recommend the conclusion that it is possible to judge that ϕ -ing is wrong while nonetheless being praiseworthy in ϕ -ing. But it is important to note—and here I follow Smith (2004)—that this praiseworthiness is best viewed as a *global* or *overall* kind of praiseworthiness. Thinking that Huck is praiseworthy in this sense is compatible with the thought that Huck is failing to comply with a local duty of respect. For one can take overall praise and blame to reflect one's compliance or lack of compliance with a whole range of local duties of respect. And there are numerous such duties with which Huck *is* complying.

There are other reasons to doubt that this case shows that there is no duty of responsiveness to *de dicto* normative appearances. Firstly, as Kriegel (2012) observes, it is natural to regard Huck as having the "alief" that turning Jim in is wrong.¹⁵ The earmarks of alief are present if we understand the case as Arpaly says we must (perceptual shift and all).¹⁶ Absent the case for attributing alief, Huck might not be praiseworthy. But then the case would suggest that responsiveness to *de dicto* normative aliefs is necessary for praiseworthiness. Secondly, as Holton (MS) observes, it is unclear that Huck has any stable relevant normative beliefs at the time of action. If not, the case is no counterexample to the thought that acting against the *de dicto* normative appearances renders one blameworthy. Finally, as Arpaly agrees, Huck would be *more* praiseworthy if he had the knowledge that it is right to help Jim and acted from it: she just denies that this is *necessary* for him to be praiseworthy.

For all we have seen, then, it would be reasonable to maintain that there is a local duty with which Huck fails to comply, where that fact renders him open to local criticism even if his choice is praiseworthy in a global sense.

2.3.2 Fetishism?

But what would this duty be? Here we must consider a different objection to placing weight on responsiveness to normative beliefs. In rehearsing one reply to this objec-

¹⁵ On the alief/belief distinction, see Gendler (2008).

¹⁶ Some theories of apparent reasons require one to have what is naturally understood as an alief that there is sufficient objective reason to ϕ if one is to have sufficient apparent reason to ϕ —i.e., that one treats one's situation as one in which there is sufficient objective reason to ϕ . See e.g. Lord (2013).

tion, we will end up with an account of a phenomenon—namely, *commitment*—that is easily conflated with respect but that will also have a role.

Respect as discussed earlier is a form of *de re* concern for reasons, though it can be manifested even when we are misled about the presence of those reasons. *De dicto* normative appearances seem capable of misleading us not merely about whether certain reasons are present, but also about which things are reasons. If responding to these appearances grounds a form of concern, one might worry that it is a fetishistic concern for rightness as such.

Although this worry continues to prove influential, I believe it has been convincingly answered. For one thing, it is not clear that the only alternative to *de re* concern is a first-order concern for acting rightly as such. Dreier (2000) pointed to a further alternative.¹⁷ Rather than requiring the first-order desire to perform right actions for the sake of performing right actions as such, one could require a second-order desire with the following form:

(*) One desires that [if ϕ -ing is morally right, one desires that [one ϕ for its own sake]].

Being guided by (*) is compatible with acquiring *de re* desires to perform particular right actions for their own sake. Yet one side of the fetishism worry is that having the *de dicto* desire will preclude *de re* caring about right-making features for their own sake. If we enshrine the relevant form of concern in a second-order desire like (*), this worry evaporates.

The proponent of the fetishism charge might complain that we have merely moved the lump under the rug. But as Dreier observed, this complaint is unjustified. The second-order desire is hardly objectionable:

If [someone] were told that some day in the future she will see clearly what features of actions are the right-making ones, and asked whether she hopes that she will be moved by these features, she surely must say that she does hope so. Otherwise she could hardly be called a good moral agent. So it is not [(*)] itself that provides any ground for complaint.¹⁸

What might be objectionable is if the first-order desires had to be sustained by the second-order desire. But we are not committed to recommending that dependence. While the original cause of the first-order desires will be the second-order desire, these desires can be sustained just by *de re* awareness of the right-making features. So, there is a non-fetishistic alternative to first-order *de dicto* concern for rightness.

The fetishism objection to first-order *de dicto* concern does not withstand scrutiny anyway.¹⁹ This concern would be fetishistic if it were one's sole non-instrumental concern, so that one's *de re* concerns were merely instrumental. But the relation between the *de dicto* and *de re* concerns need not be instrumental. If the relation is not instrumental, the appearance of fetishism disappears. *De dicto* concern is not fetishistic as such. It is only fetishistic when it plays a certain role—when it gets in the way of non-instrumental caring about particular right actions or valuable things. But it need not do that.

¹⁷ Dreier discusses two alternatives. I am discussing the second; see Dreier (2000: 635–38).

¹⁸ Dreier (2000: 636).

¹⁹ Others have made the point to follow; cf. Brink (1997) and Dreier (2000).

2.3.3 Commitment

While the fetishism objection to first-order *de dicto* concern fails, I prefer a version of Dreier's approach. I want the relevant concern to be a concern one fails to manifest when akratic. I am not sure that (*) is a desire that one cannot manifest when akratic. Mightn't an akratic agent desire that they not be akratic and manifest this desire by bemoaning their akasia? If so, then if there is something objectionable about akasia, it is not that this desire is missing or not manifest. It is better, I think, to claim that what is missing is the manifestation of a second-order *commitment* to intending to perform right actions for their own sake.²⁰ We can replace (*) with:

(**) One has the commitment that [if ϕ -ing is morally right, one intends to [ϕ for its own sake]].

One could have this commitment while being occasionally akratic at the first order. But one could not manifest this commitment in being akratic.²¹ One does not manifest commitment to intending to ϕ if ϕ -ing is right by bemoaning one's akasia. What one bemoans is that one is not manifesting that commitment!

It is plausible that the commitment one finds lacking in those who are insensitive to apparent rightness is the commitment picked out in (**). As I have argued, this commitment is not fetishistic. If we think that people are open to local blame for acting against their beliefs about what is right, we are committed to thinking that rightness calls for such commitment. While there are influential doubters, their doubts are unfounded, at least if understood as a case against the modest thought that one is open to local blame in each case one is akratic.

Ultimately, I suspect that what is happening in apparent cases of rational akasia is that one is not fully responsive to the substantive apparent reasons: if one were, one wouldn't have the false normative belief. The apparent reasons Huck has against turning in Jim are apparent evidence against his false belief. So it is hard to see how Huck could have sufficient apparent reason to think that he should turn in Jim in the relevant case. I will defend this diagnosis in §5 and show that the duties of respect and commitment do not conflict.

2.4 Assessing Weak Transparency—Structural

I have addressed what I take to be the main reasons for rejecting a local norm of *de dicto* commitment to reasons-responsiveness. Granting that there is such a norm, how does it bear on whether structural apparent reasons are real reasons?

So far I have been primarily interested in showing that (i) one can be locally blameworthy for akasia and that (ii) the norm one violates if one is locally blameworthy for akasia is a local norm of commitment to reasons-responsiveness. If (i) and (ii) are true, we still strictly speaking only get a reason not to be akratic. That alone, one might think, does not get us the detached reason to act.

²⁰ This is psychological commitment, not the normative commitment Shpall (2014) discusses.

²¹ Perhaps one could manifest the commitment in (*) by intending to remedy one's akasia. But then I do not see that one would be locally blameworthy. Still, I think it is better to understand this as a case in which one manifests an even higher-order commitment.

To get the detached reason, we can attend to two further points. Firstly, when the appearance is non-doxastic, there will be only one way to avoid conflict through reasoning. So the pressure will be narrow-scope. Secondly, when the appearance is doxastic, we still get a serious reason to adopt the attitude given the belief: we just *also* get an equally serious reason to drop the belief.²² By the lights of the norm of commitment, there is no stronger reason for either option. That is not to say that there is no serious reason to ϕ (given the belief).²³ This is a surprising claim in itself. Some think it alone yields unacceptable bootstrapping.²⁴ But we should accept it with some qualifications to be discussed in §4. Carefully understood, it does not yield an unacceptable kind of bootstrapping. Indeed, it is plausible that if one’s normative belief is false, one will have sufficient apparent reason to drop that belief and the norm of respect will push one in that direction.

The thing to stress before turning to the next section is that both arguments in this section were deliberately restricted. The first argument was explicitly restricted to reasons associated with duties we have to things that call for respect. Since I have not argued that all providers of reasons demand respect, the argument so far does not establish the unrestricted relative of Weak Transparency—Substantive. Similarly for the second argument: I focused there on the reasons associated with moral rightness and wrongness. Since I have not argued that the features of reasons associated with moral rightness and wrongness that I was exploiting are general features of reasons, the argument so far does not establish the unrestricted relative of Weak Transparency—Structural.

3 Generalizing, Part I: Respect for Reasons and the Reality of Substantive Apparent Reasons

3.1 The Thesis

In this section, I will defend the following broader relative of the first core thesis from the last section:

Weak Transparency—Substantive+: Necessarily, if one has an undefeated serious substantive apparent reason to ϕ , one has a serious objective reason to ϕ .

Two remarks about the scope of this thesis are in order. The first is about why “undefeated” is in the antecedent and not the consequent. It is in the antecedent because the thesis would be indefensible without it there. I want to explain why apparent reasons matter by appealing to an ideal of respect for objective reasons.

²² Notice that I am not claiming that one gets a reason to adopt the attitude when the doxastic appearance is not in place. I am not relying on the principle that if one has reason to make it true that [p or q], one has a reason to make it true that p and a reason to make it true that q . As Rippon (2011) observes, this principle is false. Raz (2005) does seem to rely on this principle. But my claim is that if one has reason to make it true that [if p , then q], then one has reason to make it true that q when it is also true that p . This principle is not susceptible to Rippon’s counterexample.

²³ Cf. Schroeder (2005) on Raz (2005).

²⁴ Cf. Raz (2005).

Acting against undefeated serious apparent reasons manifests disrespect for objective reasons. Not so for defeated apparent reasons: acting for them manifests disrespect for objective reasons and ignoring them manifests no obvious disrespect. So I reject the principle that drops “undefeated” from the antecedent.

If “undefeated” is in the antecedent, why isn’t it in the consequent? Because there can be rebutting defeaters beyond one’s ken that outweigh the reasons one gets from the norm of respect.²⁵ This fact does raise questions about how to understand the stringency of substantive rationality, which I will address in §6.

The second remark to make is about what “serious” means. So far I have been using “serious” as if it were synonymous with “weighty”. The reason why “seriousness” so understood has played a role is that I do not want to defend the uninteresting claim that there is some trivially weak objective reason to heed apparent reasons: the claim is rather that if there is a serious apparent reason to ϕ , there is a similarly serious objective reason to ϕ .

There is something else that “serious” could indicate. One might think that it is not at all irrational to ignore apparent undefeated *enticing* reasons.²⁶ So, if one wants to explain why apparent reasons are real reasons by appeal to some ideal of respect for reasons, one might wonder how the story goes for enticing reasons. Surely one manifests no disrespect in ignoring apparent enticing reasons. This suggests that we might need a different argument to explain why apparent enticing reasons yield real reasons in the respect-based framework.

Frankly, I am skeptical that apparent enticing reasons to ϕ *do* necessarily yield objective reasons to ϕ . The project of explaining their normativity strikes me as less pressing than the project of explaining the normativity of apparent preemptory reasons. Indeed, the former project is obviously not part of the standard project of vindicating the normativity of rationality. So I will use “serious” to mean “weighty and not merely enticing”.

3.2 The Argument in Outline

With these clarifications in mind, let’s consider the argument that I will use to defend Weak Transparency—Substantive+.

The Respect Argument

1. There is an objective duty to manifest respect for objective reasons.
2. One manifests respect for objective reasons iff one heeds undefeated serious apparent reasons.
3. So, there is a derived objective duty to heed undefeated serious apparent reasons.
4. If (3), then if one has an undefeated serious apparent reason to ϕ , one has a serious objective reason to ϕ .

²⁵ I do not think there can be objective *undercutting* defeaters in the relevant cases: respect-based objective reasons give one a safeguard against them. A totally objectively undercut reason is not really an objective reason. But the norm of respect will convert an undefeated apparent reason into an objective reason.

²⁶ On enticing reasons, see Dancy (2004).

5. So, if one has an undefeated serious apparent reason to ϕ , one has a serious objective reason to ϕ .

I will devote §3.3 and §3.4 to defending (1) and (2). Since (3) follows from (1) and (2), (4) is obvious, and (5) follows from (3) and (4), this will secure the argument.

3.3 Defending (1): Domain-Relative Blameworthiness, Blameworthiness in the Court of Overall Reason, and Respect

What is the duty of respect for objective reasons? Why think we have this duty?

Let's back up. It is plausible that for every domain (e.g., morality, prudence, epistemology...), there is a norm of respect for the reasons in the domain, where these reasons are the things that bear the domain-relative reason-for relation to acts and attitudes.²⁷ What makes these various norms of respect belong to a unified class is the role they play. The norm of respect for moral reasons explains the force of assessments of moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. The norm of respect for prudential reasons explains the force of assessments of prudential blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. The norm of respect for epistemic reasons explains the force of assessments of epistemic blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. And so on.

One might be skeptical that there is such a thing as non-moral blameworthiness. One encounters such skepticism in the literature on epistemic blameworthiness.²⁸ But this skepticism is at best terminologically justified. Perhaps "blame" is the wrong word to use because it has a special tie to reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation. But it does not follow that in other domains, there is no functional analogue of blame. In every domain, there is a distinction between inexcusable and excusable first-order norm violation. If there is no apparent reason to think that by ϕ -ing you would be ψ -ing, where ψ -ing would constitute violation of some first-order norm in the domain, you are *ceteris paribus* excusable for intentionally ϕ -ing if ϕ -ing in fact violates this duty. If there is sufficient apparent reason to think that by ϕ -ing you would be ψ -ing, where ψ -ing would constitute violation of some norm in the domain, your intentionally ϕ -ing is *ceteris paribus* inexcusable.

One is excusable in the domain in the same conditions in which one avoids violating the second-order norm of respect in the domain. One is inexcusable in the domain in the same conditions in which one violates the second-order norm of respect in the domain. The reason why the analogues of blame have force is that they amount to pointing to the fact that one has violated the norm of respect in the domain. Of course, it is possible to do something blameworthy while doing (accidentally) what the first-order reasons in the domain favor. But it does not

²⁷ We could also call these things "sources of reasons" (as I did earlier). Reasons talk is unhelpfully waffly here: when we say that a fact *gives us* a reason, this makes it sound like there is something else—the reason—that is being given. I prefer to call the particular things that stand in reason-for relations "reasons". But if we speak of sources, we can say that we manifest respect for sources of reasons *by* manifesting respect for the reasons they give. And we do the latter, I claim, *by* heeding the relevant apparent reasons.

²⁸ See, for example, Dougherty (2012).

follow that there is not necessarily *any* norm one violates when one is blameworthy. There is *a* norm. It is the second-order norm of respect.

Whether one wants to mark the more general contrast between inexcusable and excusable first-order norm violation using “blame” talk is a terminological matter. There are analogues of blame—things that play a similar role—in other domains. To say that these things play *a* similar role to blame is not to say that all the roles of blame are paralleled: they simply parallel each other when it comes to the role of carving out the inexcusable/excusable violation distinction. So, I think we have as much reason to think that there are norms of respect for objective reasons in non-moral domains as there is to think that there is a norm of respect for objective reasons in the moral domain.

Now, I have been talking as if there is some overarching norm beyond particular norms of respect for objective reasons in particular domains. On an opposing view, there is no overarching norm of respect but rather just a collection of norms of respect in various domains. Clearly, this opposing view is simpler. Is that reason enough to dismiss my view?

Only if there are no appraisals we need to explain that cannot be explained by particular norms of respect in particular domains. But there must be such a thing as blameworthiness and praiseworthiness in the court of overall reason. Reasons of morality and reasons of prudence can be placed on a single scale to yield an overall fact about what one has most reason to do. Similarly for apparent reasons: what one has most apparent reason to do will not be relativized to any domain. We should expect there to be a distinctive appraisal we can make of someone who fails to heed the balance of apparent reasons (all domains considered), and of someone who heeds the balance of apparent reasons (all domains considered).

One way to describe these appraisals is with the phrases “blameworthiness in the court of overall reason” and “praiseworthiness in the court of overall reason”. This yields a nice symmetry. But there are ordinary words that do the job: namely, “irrationality” and “rationality”. We need a norm of respect to explain the force of these appraisals. The norm is the norm of respect for objective reasons (period), just as the norm of respect for objective moral reasons is the norm that underpins appraisals of moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.

So, we have good reason to accept premise (1) in the Respect Argument. We are already committed to norms of respect for the reasons of particular domains by our practice of agent-directed criticism and praise for each domain. But we have a need for assessments that reflect the balance of these norms of respect—a need for praise and blame in the court of overall reason. Those assessments *just are* assessments of substantive rationality. The duty of respect for objective reasons is the duty that backs those assessments. Just as blameworthiness narrowly construed is the criticism issued by morality, substantive irrationality is the criticism issued by overall reason. And just as respect for moral reasons is the norm of morality that grounds this criticism, so respect for reasons (period) is the norm of overall reason that grounds this criticism.

3.4 Why Heeding Apparent Reasons Fulfills this Duty

How can the duty of respect for objective reasons be the duty that backs assessments of substantive rationality? How—as premise (2) says—can heeding apparent reasons be a way to manifest respect for objective reasons?

Remember that claims of the form “S manifests respect for Fs” do not entail claims of the form “There exist some Fs for which S manifests respect”. To put this more directly, the kind of respect introduced in §2 exhibits *intentional inexistence*: one can manifest disrespect for non-human animals even if there are no particular non-human animals that one is disrespecting. Insofar as it gives force to the claim that Audrey is worthy of resentment for her gross disrespect for non-human animals, the requirement to not manifest disrespect for non-human animals is compatible with this intentional inexistence. One could insist that Audrey would be more blameworthy if a real cat were being run over. But she is still blameworthy *for her reaction*. So there is a duty of respect that she violates.

We can generalize this observation: similar points can be made about other examples in the moral case and about examples in non-moral cases. For every kind of blameworthiness we can imagine, there will be a corresponding norm of respect, where the sort of respect that figures in that norm exhibits intentional inexistence. It will be a requirement of respect for moral reasons that one can violate even if one is not disrespecting any standard concrete providers of moral reasons. Now, suppose that charges of substantive irrationality simply amount to charges of blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. And suppose that the fundamental requirement in the court of overall reason is the requirement to correctly respond to the overall balance of objective reasons. Then it will be plausible that what underpins charges of substantive irrationality is the requirement of respect for objective reasons (period). One can violate this requirement even if one is not disrespecting any concrete providers of objective reasons (period).

Just as one can manifest disrespect for objective moral reasons *by* failing to heed the apparent moral reasons, so one can manifest disrespect for objective reasons (period) *by* failing to heed the apparent reasons (period). So, while premise (2) in the Respect Argument can sound incredible on first blush, it is perfectly sensible on second blush. Once we note that respect exhibits intentional inexistence, we find that there is a clear case for (2).

Having defended the two controversial premises in the Respect Argument, the argument would appear to succeed. Of course, this is not to say that I have answered all objections. I save the task of answering further objections for §6.

4 Generalizing, Part II: Commitment to Reasons and the Reality of Structural Apparent Reasons

4.1 The Thesis and the Argument in Outline

The point of this section will resemble that of the last. The point will be to defend the following generalization of the second core thesis from §2:

Weak Transparency—Structural+: Necessarily, if one has an undefeated serious structural apparent reason to ϕ , one has a serious objective reason to ϕ .

The argument for this thesis parallels the Respect Argument:

The Commitment Argument

1. There is an objective duty to manifest commitment to objective reasons-responsiveness.
2. One fulfills this duty iff one heeds one's *de dicto* beliefs about the presence of undefeated serious objective reasons.
3. So, there is a derived duty to heed one's *de dicto* beliefs about the presence of undefeated serious objective reasons.
4. If (3), then if one has an undefeated serious structural apparent reason to ϕ , one has a serious objective reason to ϕ .
5. So, if one has an undefeated serious structural apparent reason to ϕ , one has a serious objective reason to ϕ .

My defense of this argument will sound familiar. I will devote §4.3 and §4.4 to defending premises (1) and (2). I will also address some worries about (4) in §4.4. Since (3) follows from (1) and (2) and (5) follows from (3) and (4), this will suffice to defend the argument.

4.2 Commitment to Objective Reasons-Responsiveness

What is the duty of commitment? Why think that we have this duty?

Let's back up once again. It is plausible that for every domain (morality, prudence, epistemology, etc.), there is a second-order duty that one manifest commitment to heeding first-order reasons in the domain. What makes these various duties of commitment belong to a unified class is the role they play. The duty of commitment to moral reasons-responsiveness is what explains the force of ascriptions of recklessness and conscientiousness in the moral domain. The duty of commitment to prudential reasons-responsiveness explains the force of ascriptions of recklessness and conscientiousness in the prudential domain. The duty of commitment to epistemic reasons-responsiveness explains the force of ascriptions of recklessness and conscientiousness in the epistemic domain. And so on.

As I granted in §2, recklessness is at best one local dimension of blameworthiness and conscientiousness is at best one local dimension of praiseworthiness. It is compatible with violating a duty of commitment that one is praiseworthy in a global sense. It is also compatible with complying with a duty of commitment that one is blameworthy in a global sense. But none of this shows that there is no duty of commitment. It only shows that duties of commitment are not the only second-order duties to consider when determining whether someone is blameworthy or praiseworthy. Duties of respect also play a role.

To determine how much weight considerations of commitment have in global assessments of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, we need to know more about

what the norms of commitment require and which kinds of recklessness are incompatible with these norms. I have already suggested that in the moral case, the norm calls for one to manifest the following second-order commitment:

(**) One has the commitment that [if ϕ -ing is morally right, one intends to [ϕ for its own sake]].

Hence, the norm of commitment in the moral case is the following:

(MC) One ought morally to have and manifest one's commitment that [if ϕ -ing is morally right, one intends to [ϕ for its own sake]].

In §2, I suggested that it is impossible to manifest this commitment through recklessness. As I noted in discussing Arpaly's argument, it is not obvious what level of acceptance matters for determining whether someone is reckless. Is it reckless to act against one's explicit judgment that ϕ -ing is morally right if one has a powerful competing alief, implicit belief, or so on, that ϕ -ing is not morally right? Maybe. But perhaps it is more blameworthy if one acts against one's normative aliefs. I will not try to settle which level of acceptance matters most for determining whether someone has violated the norms of commitment. I point to the variety of levels only to stress that the norm of commitment may be more obviously relevant to overall praiseworthiness and blameworthiness if we take other levels than the level of explicit, conscious judgment into account.

What matters more for now is that within each domain, there is a norm of second-order commitment to first-order reasons-responsiveness that grounds assessments of recklessness and conscientiousness. Given this point, it is easy to argue for premise (1) in the Commitment Argument in the same way that we argued for premise (1) in the Respect Argument.

Of course, it would be simpler to claim that there is no norm of commitment to objective reasons-responsiveness beyond particular norms of commitment in particular domains. But parsimony only yields a reason to reject such a norm if there are no appraisals whose force we need such a norm to explain. There are some. There is such a thing as recklessness from the point of view of overall reason. There is nothing reckless from the point of view of overall reason about someone who judges that it is morally wrong to ϕ and who intends to ϕ if this person also believes that the norms of morality are not really normative. To determine whether someone is reckless from the point of view of overall reason, we need to attend to this person's views about what she has overall reason to do. What is recklessness from the point of view of overall reason? "Recklessness from the point of view of overall reason" is just another name for the canonical form of structural irrationality: namely, *akrasia*.

Conversely for conscientiousness. If one thinks at every level that commonsense morality is not normative, it would hardly manifest conscientiousness if one did what one believed commonsense morality required anyway because one thought commonsense morality required it. To determine whether one is conscientious full-stop, we need to attend to one's views about what one has overall reason to do and how these views affect one's decisions or thoughts. What is conscientiousness full-stop? "Conscientiousness full-stop" is just another name for the canonical example of structural rationality: namely, *enkrasia*.

So there are appraisals whose force we need the norm of commitment to reasons-responsiveness *simpliciter* to ground. That is a good reason to think that there is a norm of commitment to reasons-responsiveness *simpliciter*.

We could have arrived at this conclusion on other grounds. We will fail to fully describe normative reality if we simply describe what the various normative domains require. Perhaps the most important normative facts are facts about how the reasons from various domains weigh up to yield facts about what there is overall most reason to do. We should expect there to be corresponding appraisals that turn on what there is overall most structural apparent reason for a particular agent to do and how well the agent is responding to these structural apparent reasons. These appraisals need to be backed by a norm of commitment just as much as appraisals of conscientiousness, hypocrisy, and recklessness within particular domains need to be backed by domain-relative norms of commitment.

4.3 Being Enkratic and Meeting the Duty of Commitment

So much for a defense of premise (1) in the Commitment Argument. Premise (2) in the Commitment Argument is more straightforward than premise (2) in the Respect Argument. It is clear that one can manifest one's commitment to norm-responsiveness without conforming to the norm to which one is manifesting commitment, so long as that non-conformity was unexpected. I can manifest my commitment to driving legally by always driving in the ways that I believe to be legally permitted. But sometimes I might be mistaken about what is legally permitted. The speed limit might change without my receiving any notice. So manifesting my commitment may not guarantee that I am driving legally.

If conformity is not required for one to manifest commitment to a norm, what is required? The obvious answer is that what is required is that (i) one be so disposed that if there are decisive structural apparent reasons relative to the norm to ϕ , one ϕ s, and (ii) one manifest this disposition. But one has to be enkratic with respect to the norm to meet these conditions. The norm to which one is manifesting commitment when one satisfies enkratic requirements is the norm of objective reasons-responsiveness. Hence, satisfying enkratic requirements is the way to fulfill the duty of commitment to objective reasons-responsiveness.

4.4 Some Worries about (4) Addressed

I turn to address some worries about premise (4) in the Commitment Argument. One worry about this premise stems from the thought that it is usually possible to remove the pressure of a structural apparent reason by dropping the belief that generates it. If so, how can an apparent reason to ϕ together with the duty of commitment ever provide one with an objective reason to ϕ ?

The question rests on a confusion. If there is a duty to ϕ when one ψ s, then if one is ψ -ing, there will be a reason to ϕ . The fact that the existence of this reason is conditional on one's ψ -ing does not show that it is not a reason. There is some reason to speak French when in France. If one is in France, one could leave and thereby escape the pressure to speak French. But one does have a reason to speak

French as long as one remains in France. That this reason would cease to exist when one leaves France does not mean that it is not there when one is in France. Since we are granting that there is a duty to manifest commitment to reasons-responsiveness, we have an answer to the worry.

But what if the best way of understanding structural apparent reasons is the wide-scope way, as I myself find plausible when the appearances are doxastic? Aren't we then committing the fallacy of detachment?

While there is a fallacy of detachment in the case of wide-scope all-things-considered *oughts*, there is no obvious fallacy of detachment for wide-scope *reasons*. Yes, it does not follow from the claim that one all-things-considered ought to [ϕ if one ψ s] and the claim that one is ψ -ing that one all-things-considered ought to ϕ . Perhaps one should not be ψ -ing. But even if one should not be ψ -ing, it could be true that there is a serious—and outweighed—reason to ϕ .

Plausibly, a reason remains: one would be meeting the duty of commitment by ϕ -ing. It would be better if one dropped the belief and avoided meeting the duty of commitment in this way. But the fact that one would be meeting the duty of commitment by ϕ -ing is a serious reason anyway, even if it is outweighed by whatever overwhelming reason there might be not to ϕ . This is not to say that the duty of commitment is less stringent than whatever overwhelming reason outweighs the detached reason. That detached reason will not have the deontic force of the duty of commitment that generates it because heeding one's belief here is not *necessary* for meeting the duty, but just *sufficient*.

What if the belief is unalterable? Here it is false that heeding the belief will necessarily facilitate manifesting commitment. Suppose you have a compulsive belief that you have conclusive reason to wash your hands 100 times after eating tomatoes. You are aware that it is a compulsive belief, but you cannot get yourself to drop it. I cannot see that heeding this belief would be a way to manifest commitment to objective reasons-responsiveness. This fact suggests that the norm of commitment does not vindicate an *unrestricted* version of Enkrasia on which you are rationally required to heed your belief that you ought to ϕ by ϕ -ing even when that belief is itself structurally irrational. But we should reject that version.

What if the belief is unalterable but not structurally irrational?²⁹ I find it hard to see how a belief could be unalterable but structurally rational. For if this belief is unalterable, it would not change in the face of any structural apparent reasons to the contrary. Even if it is not structurally irrational, this belief is not structurally rational. But we do not need to vindicate an unrestricted form of Enkrasia on which we ought rationally to heed beliefs that are not structurally rational. These cases of unalterability are simply arguments against such an unrestricted form of Enkrasia.

5 Can Commitment and Respect Conflict?

The Respect Argument and the Commitment Argument appear to work. One might wonder how the duty of commitment and the duty of respect interact. Can these duties conflict?

²⁹ Setiya (2007) and Schroeder (2009) draw attention to these cases.

We can consider two sorts of cases that might suggest that they can conflict. In both, the substantive apparent reasons disfavor ϕ -ing. In Case 1, you also believe that there is decisive reason to ϕ , where this belief is itself structurally rational. In Case 2, by contrast, you have not formed the belief that there is a decisive reason to ϕ . But it does seem to you in the non-doxastic sense that there is decisive reason to ϕ and there are no seemings to the contrary.

In Case 1, the duty of commitment is neutral on whether you should heed your belief or abandon it. The duty of commitment does give you a serious reason to heed your belief. But it gives you an equally serious reason to abandon your belief if you can do so rationally. Both are ways to manifest commitment to reasons-responsiveness, and so the duty of commitment doesn't decide which way you should go.³⁰ So, here there is no conflict between respect and commitment if you can drop your belief rationally.

Could you drop your belief rationally in every case of this form (assuming your belief is alterable)? You could if you could drop your belief for some sufficient apparent reason. But it is plausible that if the substantive apparent reasons disfavor ϕ -ing, you have a sufficient apparent reason to abandon your belief. For these substantive apparent reasons are *also* apparent evidence against your belief. You can respond to this apparent evidence by dropping your belief without manifesting a lack of commitment to reasons-responsiveness.

Consider a simple example to see the plausibility of this claim. You are working under the assumption that you should stay in your office to finish practicing your talk. A fire alarm sounds and it becomes clear that the building is on fire: you can smell smoke, you can see flames in the hallway, and you can hear your colleagues swearing. The substantive apparent reasons count against your staying in your office. But suppose you were so absorbed in preparing your talk that it takes you a moment to process the appearances: you do not instantly revise your belief that you should stay in your office. It is clear that once you process what appears to be happening, you can rationally abandon your belief that you should stay in your office: there is no irrationality in that transition at all. You thereby manifest no lack of commitment to reasons-responsiveness.

The crucial features of this case will be present in any specification of Case 1: for if the substantive apparent reasons disfavor ϕ -ing, you can treat them as evidence against your old belief that you should ϕ without manifesting a lack of commitment to reasons-responsiveness.³¹ So, Case 1 is not a case of conflict.

What about Case 2? This case may seem trickier because non-doxastic seemings cannot be rationally revised. This feature of Case 2 might make it appear like a case in which conflict will be inevitable. But this appearance is misleading.

Consider a variation on the last example to see why. Suppose that you earlier reflected on what you should do and it non-doxastically seemed to you that you must keep working in your office. This seeming made it rational for you to believe

³⁰ *Pace* Kolodny (2005), it is false that the fact that this alleged duty doesn't single out a course of action entails that it is not really a duty. If the building is about to explode, you have a prudential duty to leave it. This duty leaves open which door you should take.

³¹ At any rate, this will be true on the best theories of substantive apparent reasons, such as Whiting (2013)'s.

that you must press on. Now things proceed as before: a fire alarm sounds, smoke billows in the hallway, your colleagues swear, etc., but it takes you a moment to process these facts. If practicing the talk matters a lot, your visceral side might sustain the seeming that you must keep practicing. That seeming might make you angry about the fire. But you can *dismiss this seeming as misleading* on the basis of the newly registered apparent facts and form the belief that you now must leave your office on the basis of them. You can do this without any irrationality.

Here is a natural way to think about what is happening here. When there are no seemings to the contrary, the seeming that you have decisive reasons to ϕ exerts strong rational pressure to ϕ . But it does that in an indirect way: namely, by making it rational for you to believe that you have decisive reasons to ϕ , where the fact that it is rational for you to believe that you have decisive reasons to ϕ then generates rational pressure to ϕ . However we label the pressure to ϕ , it is clear that it can be undercut when there is a stream of new apparent evidence against the belief that you have decisive reasons to ϕ : these seemings then generate rational pressure to dismiss the earlier seeming as misleading. Because the rational pressure to ϕ exerted by the original seeming can be undercut in this way, the seeming that you have decisive reasons to ϕ does not corner you into ϕ -ing.

The crucial features of this case will be present in any specification of Case 2: if the substantive apparent reasons disfavor ϕ -ing, you can use them as reasons to dismiss the seeming that you ought to ϕ as misleading. So, Case 2 is not a case in which the duties of commitment and respect conflict. Since Cases 1 and 2 are the relevant cases to consider in determining whether the duties conflict, I conclude that the duties do not conflict.

While these duties do not conflict, the duty of respect takes a kind of priority. When the appearance that one has decisive reason to ϕ is doxastic, the duty of commitment is neutral on whether one *ought* to respond to this appearance by ϕ -ing or by dropping one's belief that one ought to ϕ . One has to consult the duty of respect. In this way, the duty of respect takes the driver's seat.

But the priority of respect is not a priority in normative strength but rather a priority in order. The duty of commitment does not single out one option as required. So if one learns that one is violating a duty of commitment, one must consult the duty of respect to figure out which way to go. That does not mean that the duty of commitment is weaker than the duty of respect. So the normativity of structural rationality is not weaker than the normativity of substantive rationality.

These points give us a more satisfying response to alleged cases of rational akrasia. Suppose we take Huck to believe with full sincerity that turning Jim in is the wrong thing to do at the time of action. The rational thing for Huck to do would be to exploit the array of apparent reasons he has to drop this belief after his "perceptual shift". This is a fine way to bring himself into conformity with the norm of commitment. If he does not do this, we can criticize him on two grounds: (1) he fails to manifest respect for reasons in maintaining this belief, and (2) he manifests insufficient commitment to reasons-responsiveness if his belief that turning Jim in is the wrong thing to do is a sincere belief. But (2) does not imply that he must remedy the failure of commitment by heeding the belief.

6 Objections Answered (and Desiderata Clarified)

Having finished sketching and directly defending my view, I turn to answer some objections. In doing so, I will clarify some familiar but unclear desiderata on an account of the normativity of rationality and show that my account satisfies them.

6.1 What about Stringency?

It is often said that a satisfactory account of the normativity of rationality must explain its apparent *stringency*. Of course, rationality can issue requirements even if it is not robustly normative, just as etiquette can. So there is a trivial way in which any theory can predict stringency: it can predict that rationality issues requirements. But that is not the relevant kind of stringency. The thought is rather that if rational requirements have real force, this force must be stringent.

One might think my view cannot explain this intuition. My view was supposed to explain the objective normativity of substantive apparent reasons. But surely I cannot deny that the substantive apparent reasons might rationally require one to refuse to do something that there is overwhelming objective reason to do. For example, the appearances might suggest that the glass is filled with poison when it is in fact filled with an elixir that will cure all my ills. Here it would be irrational for me to drink from the glass even though there is overwhelming objective reason for me to drink from the glass. If so, how can I claim that we have anything more than a trivial objective reason to drink from the glass?

Reply. The apparent force of this objection rests on assumptions about stringency that everyone should reject. The objection also gets the dialectic wrong. Everyone should think (i) that there are some narrow-scope rational pressures (viz., substantive apparent reasons), (ii) that the puzzle about the normativity of rationality extends to these pressures, and (iii) that these pressures can be outweighed by unapparent objective reasons. So, everyone must agree that there can be a stronger objective reason to do what substantive rationality requires us not to do. If so, stringency obviously cannot be understood as the objection assumes.

More specifically, the following cannot be the right way to understand objective stringency:

Stringent \rightarrow *Conclusive*: If a norm has objective stringency, then there are conclusive objective reasons to comply with this norm.

What could stringency involve, if not backing by conclusive objective reasons?

My answer will rely on three suggestions: (1) there are independent illustrations of stringent objective norms that can be objectively outweighed, (2) we have good reason to treat the norms of respect that give force to charges of blameworthiness in particular domains as further illustrations, and (3) all the crucial points about these norms extend to the norms of respect that give force to charges of irrationality. The norms of respect that underpin blameworthiness show that the puzzle about stringency is more general than is often supposed. But the puzzle is solvable once

we see that there is a familiar category of the strict-but-outweighable of which norms of respect are an illustration.³²

The duty to keep one's promises provides support for (1). Consider an example from Shpall (2014: 159). Imagine that President Obama promises to repeal a law but fails to even try to keep this promise. Even if there were stronger objective reasons to keep the law in place, Obama gives us sufficient grounds for a complaint. This complaint cannot be grounded merely in some slack, trivial reason. After all, there is some slack, trivial reason for Obama to give every American a free ice cream cone. But if he ignores this reason, no one can lodge a similar complaint. The natural conclusion is that there is such a thing as the strict but outweighable. The slack/stringent distinction is not the same as the outweighable/conclusive distinction. Dancy's distinction between preemptory and enticing reasons provides one way to understand this. An older way is to think that it is possible to have a duty to ϕ even if there are stronger objective reason not to ϕ .

We already have the key to understanding what this distinction is tracking. It is staring at us in the description of the case: it is proper to *fault* Obama for failing to try to fulfill his promise even if there are sufficient reasons not to fulfill it, but improper to fault him for not even trying to give every American a free ice cream cone given that there is stronger reason not to bother. More generally:

Stringent \rightarrow (*Apparent* \rightarrow *Faultworthy*): If a norm N has objective stringency, then if it appears that one can only heed N by ϕ -ing and one doesn't ϕ , it is proper to fault one for not ϕ -ing.

This constraint on stringency poses no problem for my view. Indeed, it coheres perfectly with my view. I hold that the duties that underpin blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are duties of respect. I hold that a more general duty of respect for objective reasons underpins blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in the court of overall reason, which is just the same thing as irrationality/rationality. If so, my view explains the stringency of rational requirements.

Duties of respect afford illustrations of the stringent but outweighable of a piece with the example given by the duty to keep one's promises. Indeed, they ought to be the canonical illustrations, since they are the fundamental grounds of fault. Since I have already argued that we need a duty of respect for objective reasons to back assessments of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in the court of overall reason, we can extend the conclusion, and claim that the rational norms grounded by this duty of respect have the same kind of stringency.

This is the best we can do to vindicate the objective stringency of rationality, given that one can be required by rationality to do something that there is not conclusive objective reason to do. If objective stringency is a datum, it should also be a datum that objective stringency doesn't entail objective conclusiveness. A natural way to rethink stringency undermines the objection.

³² Cf. Lord and Maguire (forthcoming). Shpall (2014: 158–161) gives great examples that I will mention, though I do not accept his diagnosis of these examples.

6.2 But Isn't Bootstrapping Impossible?

Another important objection to consider is a simple one. We had the intuition that bootstrapping is impossible. My account, however, seems to license bootstrapping. How is this not a *reductio* of the account?

Reply. My strategy here will resemble my strategy for replying to the last objection. I agree that it is a desideratum on an account of the normativity of rationality that it not vindicate bootstrapping. I disagree, however, that my account vindicates bootstrapping when we properly understand what bootstrapping involves and why it is objectionable.

What does bootstrapping involve and why is it objectionable? The literature is not as clear about this as one would like. Sometimes it is claimed that if an account predicts that the belief or appearance that one has a strong reason to ϕ gives one a strong reason to ϕ , the account thereby vindicates bootstrapping. But it is implausible that this is all that bootstrapping involves. Many people in epistemology think that apparent evidence about the quality of one's evidence can significantly affect what it is rational to believe at the first order. It is hard to see how that thought alone legitimates bootstrapping.

The real worry about bootstrapping is that you can get yourself to have a sufficient reason to ϕ simply in virtue of making it seem to yourself that you have a strong undefeated reason to ϕ . That is a worry about more than the weak transparency thesis I defended. To put this more sharply, a better way to think about what is involved in licensing bootstrapping is this:

An account licenses bootstrapping only if it predicts that:

1. the sheer fact that it seems to you that you have a strong undefeated reason to ϕ is a strong undefeated reason to ϕ , on the basis of which you can justifiably ϕ ,
with the result that
2. if you make it seem to you that you have a strong undefeated reason to ϕ , you can go on to justifiably ϕ .

If this is right, my account does not vindicate bootstrapping for several reasons.

First of all, a defender of my account can deny that you can use the sheer fact that it seems to you that you have an undefeated reason to ϕ as a basis for justifiably ϕ -ing. Respect and commitment not only place constraints on what combinations of mental states are permitted, but also on how you reason to new mental states. And it is implausible that you can manifest respect for reasons or commitment to reasons-responsiveness by intending to ϕ on the basis of the sheer fact that it seems to you that you have sufficient reason to ϕ . It is also implausible to think that if you delude yourself so that it seems to you that you have an undefeated reason to ϕ , you are manifesting respect or commitment. There will be upstream violations of the duty of respect or the duty of commitment.

Second of all, my account does not entail that *undefeatedness* is transparent: you can believe that you have an undefeated serious reason to ϕ without getting an

undefeated serious reason to ϕ . If your belief is not rational, the duty of respect will require you to drop that belief or ignore it in deliberation. That you would manifest commitment to reasons-responsiveness by heeding your belief does, I think, give you a serious reason to heed that belief. But I do not think this implication by itself is objectionable. This reason is not a sufficient reason. It is equally good by the lights of the commitment norm to abandon an irrational belief if you can do so rationally or to ignore the belief in deliberation if you cannot abandon it rationally (and similarly for non-doxastic seemings).

One last reason why my account does not license bootstrapping. On my view, it is not the *sheer fact* that it seems to you that you have an undefeated reason to ϕ that gives you a serious reason to ϕ . It is rather the fact that ignoring this apparent reason would manifest relevant disrespect or lack of commitment. So my account does not predict the truth of (1).

6.3 How Are Norms of Respect Objective?

One might agree that there are norms of respect that underpin blameworthiness both in particular domains and in the court of overall reason while wondering why we should call these norms “objective”. Why do that? And how can we square this way of talking with the common view that our conclusions about whether someone is blameworthy turn on how this person is heeding her subjective obligations?

Reply. Let me take these questions in reverse. The last question has a simple answer: there is an objective norm that we violate *in virtue of* doing something subjectively wrong. It is the norm of respect. The norm of respect is the norm that makes the subjective “ought” matter. So, although it is true that we can draw conclusions about someone’s blameworthiness on the basis of how well she is heeding her subjective obligations, these conclusions only have normative significance in virtue of a more fundamental objective norm.

Of course, this answer just assumes that the norm that gives force to the subjective “ought” is an objective norm. One might still wonder why that is so.

To bring out one answer, let’s first consider norms of respect in particular domains. Recall the first example I gave in §2. The actual value of your relationship with Kris called for you to manifest respect for that relationship. You fail to manifest respect for that relationship if you fail to respond to the relevant apparent reasons even if the appearances are factually misleading. A similar point holds for all domain-relative norms of respect. There will be corresponding values—real, not merely apparent—that call for respect. At any rate, this will be plausible if we accept a conception of value that is not essentially teleological—e.g., one like Anderson (1993)’s or Scanlon (1998)’s, on which values are fitting objects of pro-attitudes (which include respect and commitment). But a norm that calls for the fitting response to a value is an objective norm, not a subjective norm.

Does this point still hold given the intentional inexistence displayed by respect? It does if we abandon a teleological conception of value and realize that values do not merely include states of affairs. Like Anderson and Scanlon, I would view the fitting object of any pro-attitude as a value. It is not just states of affairs and

existing objects that can have value in this sense, but also the properties that make particulars valuable or confer status on them. When one exhibits respect for other people in a world where the “other people” are holograms, what makes it true that one is manifesting respect for other people is that one is manifesting respect for the status that attaches to personhood. That status is not itself a particular. Nonetheless, it can be legitimately regarded as a real value if we are not working with a purely teleological conception of value. Friendship is another good example: one can manifest insufficient respect for friendship in a hologram world even if one has no actual friends. As I argued in §2, there is nothing fetishistic about these claims. None of these claims commits us to thinking that respect for particulars is an instrumental or secondary concern. None of these claims entails that caring about properties *gets in the way* of non-instrumental caring about particulars.

So, I think we have sufficient reason to regard the norms of respect within particular domains as objective. Given a non-teleological conception of value, we can naturally regard these norms as value-based. They articulate a fitting way of caring about the important if the important is understood widely (as it should be).

One might wonder how these points extend to the domain-neutral norm of respect for reasons. One answer is that the property of mattering itself matters in a derivative way. If something has the property of mattering, it is guaranteed to give us reasons. So we plausibly ought to care about what matters *by* having the commitment that if it seems to us that something underderivatively matters, we care about it for its own sake. When the claim that the property of mattering itself matters is unpacked in this way, I think we can accept it as an unmysterious and non-fetishistic claim. Indeed, as I suggested earlier (following Dreier (2000)), we are already committed to believing that the property of mattering matters if this claim is unpacked in this way. Our belief that rationality is normative is an expression of this belief. What we are doing when we respond rationally to structural apparent reasons is manifesting our commitment to what matters.

6.4 Don't Cases Like *Three Envelopes* Show that Rationality Isn't about Manifesting Respect for Objective Reasons?

Consider a familiar case:

Three Envelopes. Chester can choose one of three envelopes. He is correctly told by a reliable informant that there is \$800 in Envelope 1. He is also correctly told there is \$1000 in either Envelope 2 or 3, and that the envelope that lacks it is empty. But he cannot learn anything else about which might contain the \$1000.³³

Chester ought rationally to pick Envelope 1. But Chester can know that there is more objective reason to do otherwise. For he can know that either (i) there is more objective reason to choose Envelope 2 or (ii) that there is more objective reason to choose Envelope 3. After all, there is \$200 more in one of them. If this is right, how can rationality require us to manifest respect for objective reasons?

³³ This formulation is from Ross (2012).

Reply. Manifesting respect for objective reasons requires not manifesting disrespect for objective reasons. Randomly picking one of the two envelopes carries a serious risk of getting an envelope there is no objective reason to take. Doing that would manifest disrespect for objective reasons. Since \$800 provides a good enough objective reason such that heeding that reason manifests some respect for reasons, and there no other apparent reason such that heeding it would manifest greater respect, the norm of respect recommends Envelope 1.

In other words: minimizing expected non-conformity with objective reasons is constitutive of avoiding disrespect, and maximizing expected conformity with objective reasons is constitutive of manifesting respect. If we regard maximizing expected conformity with objective reasons to be constitutive of respect for reasons, does that mean that our position simply collapses into a familiar approach? No. Until we realize that maximizing expected conformity with reasons *constitutes something further*—namely, respect for objective reasons—we are left with no explanation of why badly failing to minimize expected non-conformity with objective reasons is a mistake. We can only see that it is a mistake by seeing that it would constitute something further—namely, a failure of respect.

Often we cannot tell why something matters until we see that it constitutes something further. If we were to look individually at the atoms that compose a painting, it is hard to see why that collection of atoms matters. But once we realize that these atoms compose a painting, we can see why they matter: they constitute something that matters in its own right, and whose significance trickles down to give the atoms some significance. In the same way, when we see that maximizing expected conformity with objective reasons constitutes respect for objective reasons, we can see why it matters. That has been the project in this paper: by seeing that responding rationally constitutes responding in a way that manifests respect for objective reasons, we can see why responding rationally matters.

7 Taking Stock and Some Concluding Remarks

Let's take stock. I began with a puzzle about the normativity of rationality. On the one hand, it is hard to see why apparent reasons would be an exception to the general thought that apparent Fs need not be real Fs. On the other hand, it looks like a genuine mistake simply to ignore the apparent reasons, not merely an apparent mistake. Yet it is hard to see how it could be a genuine mistake unless apparent reasons *are* an exception to the thought that apparent Fs need not be real Fs. So we have a puzzle. I observed that this puzzle is more general than the literature assumes. The generality of the puzzle gives us a reason to search for a new account of the normativity of rationality.

I then proceeded to develop a new account, which I dubbed the *Respect for Reasons Account*. I began by defending the more modest claim that for any X that calls for respect, if we do something that appears to violate one of our duties towards X, we thereby violate the further duty of respect for X. I pointed to a number of examples that lend support to this thought, and I explained why we cannot accommodate the intuitions about these cases merely by saying that someone has

violated their subjective obligations. We need an explanation of why violating one's subjective obligations is a genuine mistake, not merely an apparent mistake. Positing a norm of respect provides a natural explanation.

I then argued that norms of respect do not merely accompany a limited class of duties, but rather are second-order duties that accompany any first-order duty. I distinguished norms of respect for moral reasons from norms of commitment to moral reasons-responsiveness, which are the norms that give force to structural moral norms (e.g., those that back assessments of conscientiousness). Following earlier writers, I showed that we can accept norms of commitment without fetishism. As I also showed, the norms of respect and commitment are not in tension, thereby addressing defenders of praiseworthy akrasia.

These arguments provided a local vindication of the thought that apparent reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. I proceeded to generalize these arguments to apparent reasons in general. Just as norms of respect for moral reasons and commitment to moral reasons-responsiveness underpin charges of moral blameworthiness, so norms of respect for reasons (period) and commitment to reasons-responsiveness (period) underpin charges of blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. But charges of blameworthiness in the court of overall reason *just are* charges of irrationality.

So the account shows that there are genuine norms that one is violating when one is structurally and substantively irrational. The existence of these norms entails that apparent reasons across the board are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. Or near enough, at any rate. The appearances can mislead us about the presence of specific reasons. But if we have an undefeated serious apparent reason, we thereby have a serious real reason. Together with norms of respect, appearances generate real reasons.

I then described how my account can explain the stringency of rational requirements compatibly with the thought that there might be unpossessed objective reasons that outweigh the apparent reasons. Stringency is not conclusiveness. The peremptory character of the reasons of respect gives rational requirements all the stringency we can demand. I do not see how any account general enough to explain the normativity of substantive rationality can do better here, unless this account is combined with skepticism about the existence of unpossessed objective reasons. Apart from answering this worry about stringency, I also answered worries about how my account is consistent with the intuition that bootstrapping is impossible, and how I can claim that norms of respect are objective.

Because my account is rare among those in the literature in giving a unified explanation of the normativity of substantive and structural rationality, it ought to be taken very seriously. The literature needs to come to terms with the generality of the puzzle.

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