THE ETHICS OF BELIEF
SPRING 2018                    

       Meets Tuesdays in 65/1173 from 1-3pm
and Thursdays in 65/2115 from 2-3pm
 
SCHEDULE OF READINGS

For each week, the readings mainly divide into required
and optional further readings.  I include the optional
readings just in case you find the topic especially interesting and
​would like to write a paper on it or simply learn more.

Part 1. Introduction

Week 1 – The Possibility and Nature of the Ethics of Belief

Required Reading
There is none for this week.  But see Blackboard for notes and slides.

Part 2. The Normative Ethics of Belief​

Week 2 – Evidentialism vs. Pragmatism

Required Reading
Rinard, Susanna.  “Against the New Evidentialists.”   LINK
Shah, Nishi.  "A New Argument for Evidentialism."   LINK

Optional Further Reading
Clifford, William K. “The Ethics of Belief.”   LINK
            James, William.  “The Will to Believe.”   LINK
Leary, Stephanie.  "In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.”   LINK
McHugh, Conor.  “The Illusion of Exclusivity.”   LINK
Nolfi, Kate. “Why Evidence (and Only Evidence) Can Justify Belief.”   LINK

Week 3 – Pragmatic Encroachment

Required Reading
Brown, Jessica.  “Knowledge and Practical Reason.”   LINK
​
Strongly Recommended Reading
            Stanley, Jason and Hawthorne, John.  “Knowledge and Action.”   LINK

Optional Further Reading
 Brown, Jessica.  “Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.”   LINK
Brown, Jessica.  “Practical Reasoning, Decision Theory, and Anti-Intellectualism.”   LINK
          Brown, Jessica.  “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.”   LINK
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew.  “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.”   LINK
Hawthorne, John.  Selections from Knowledge and Lotteries.   LINK
Lackey, Jennifer.  “Acting on Knowledge.”   LINK
Stanley, Jason.  Selections from Knowledge and Practical Interests.   LINK

Week 4 – Permissivism vs. Impermissivism

Required Reading
Schoenfield, Miriam.  “Permission to Believe.”   LINK

Strongly Recommended Reading
                        Cohen, Gerald Allan.  “Paradoxes of Conviction.”   LINK

Optional Further Reading
Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.”   LINK
Kelly, Thomas.  “Evidence Can Be Permissive.”   LINK
Sylvan, Kurt. “Illusion of Discretion.”   LINK
Vavova, Ekaterina. “Irrelevant Influences.”   LINK
White, Roger. “Epistemic Permissiveness.”   LINK

Week 5 – Epistemic Kantianism vs. Epistemic Consequentialism

Required Reading
Sylvan, K.  "An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism."   LINK
                
Optional Further Reading
Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, Geoffrey.  “A Defence of Epistemic
Consequentialism.”   LINK
Berker, Selim.  “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.”   LINK
Berker, Selim.  "The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism."   LINK
​Firth, Roderick.  “Epistemic Merit: Intrinsic and Instrumental.”   LINK
Fumerton, Richard.  “Epistemic Normativity and Justification.”   LINK
Sylvan, Kurt.  “Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.”   LINK
Sylvan, Kurt.  “Veritism Unswamped.”   LINK

3.  The Applied Ethics of Belief

Week 6 – Optimistic and Pessimistic Doxastic Attitudes

Required
Prescott, P.  "What Pessimism Is."   LINK
Preston-Roedder, R.  "Faith in Humanity."   LINK
 
Strongly Recommended though Indirectly Relevant Material
Marusic, B.  Evidence and Agency, chs. 1 and 5-7.   LINK
 
Optional Further Reading
Alston, W.  "The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition."   LINK
Dienstag, J.  "The Anatomy of Pessimism" in Pessimism.   LINK
Harris, G.  "Pessimism."   LINK
Schopenhauer, A.  "On the Sufferings of the World."   LINK
Schopenhauer, A.  "On the Vanity of Existence."   LINK
 
Podcast and Text Interview
Interview with Stephen Pinker on The Ezra Klein Show: MP3.
There is also a separate text interview with Pinker here.

Week 7 – Epistemic Injustice

Required Reading
Fricker, Miranda.  Selections from Epistemic Injustice.   LINK

Strongly Recommended Reading
Fricker, Miranda.  Further Selections from Epistemic Injustice.   LINK
​
Optional Further Reading
Anderson, Elizabeth.  “Epistemic Injustice as a Virtue of Social Institutions.”   LINK
Dotson, Kristie.  "Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression."   LINK
Fricker, Miranda.  “Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege.”   LINK
       Gendler, Tamar Szabo.  “The Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias.”   LINK
Pohlhaus, Gaile.  “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice.”   LINK
            Gougen, Stacey.  “Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality.”   LINK

Week 8 – Ideology

Required Reading
Shelby, Tommie.  “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory.”   LINK
Stanley, Jason.  Selection from How Propaganda Works.   LINK

Optional Further Reading
Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.”   LINK
Elster, John.  "Belief, Bias, and Ideology."   LINK
Geuss, Raymond.  "Ideology."   LINK
Haslanger, Sally. “Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements.”   LINK
Haslanger, Sally.  "Ideology Beyond Belief."   LINK
            Lippmann, Walter.  Selections from Public Opinion.   LINK
     Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich.  Selections from The German Ideology.   LINK
Rosen, Michael.  "The Forms of False Consciousness."   LINK
Srinivasan, A.  "Philosophy and Ideology."   LINK
       Stanley, Jason.  Further selections from How Propaganda Works​.   LINK-1, LINK-2

Week 9 –  Knowledge and Trust in Epistemic Authorities

Required Reading
Zagzebski, L.  Selections from Epistemic Authority.  LINK-1, LINK-2
 
Strongly Recommended Reading
Zagzebski, L.  Further Selection from Epistemic Authority.  LINK
Fricker, E.  'Second-Hand Knowledge.'   LINK
 
Optional Further Reading
Holton, R.  ‘Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe’   LINK
 Jones, K.  ‘Trustworthiness’   LINK
McLeod, C.  ‘Trust’   LINK
Wanderer, J. and Townsend, L.  ‘Is it Rational to Trust?’   LINK
Zagzebski, L.  Yet Further Selections from Epistemic Authority.   LINK-1, LINK-2
​
4.  The Meta-Ethics of Belief

Week 10 – Doxastic Involuntarism and Doxastic Compatibilism

Required
Alston, W. “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification”   LINK
Hieronymi, P.  “Responsibility for Believing”   LINK
 
Strongly Recommended Reading
Hieronymi, P.  “Controlling Attitudes”   LINK
Ryan, S.  “Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief”   LINK

Optional Further Reading
Feldman, R.  “The Ethics of Belief”   LINK
McHugh, C.  “Exercising Doxastic Freedom”   LINK
McHugh, C. “Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness”   LINK
Peels, R.  “Against Doxastic Compatibilism”   LINK
Steup, M.  “Doxastic Freedom”   LINK
Steup, M. “Belief, Voluntariness, and Intentionality”   LINK

Week 11 – The Source of Doxastic Norms

Required Reading
Velleman, J. David.  "On The Aim of Belief."   LINK

Optional Further Reading
Enoch, David.  “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action.”   LINK
            McHugh, Conor.  “Belief and Aims.”   LINK
            Owens, David.  “Does Belief Have an Aim?”   LINK
Railton, Peter.  “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Action and Belief.”   LINK
Railton, Peter.  “Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief.”   LINK
                      Shah, Nishi.  “How Truth Governs Belief.”   LINK