

Kurt L. Sylvan

- CONTACT INFORMATION Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities
University of Southampton
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(+44) 07922 773365
- AOS Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
- AOC Metaethics, Metaphysics, Political Philosophy (esp. Egalitarianism and the Normative Foundations of Social Democracy), Classical Indian Philosophy
- POSITIONS **University of Southampton**, Associate Professor since 2020
University of Southampton, Lecturer from 2015-2019
University of Southampton, Postdoc in the *Normativity: Epistemic and Practical* AHRC project, 2014-2015
- EDUCATION **Rutgers University**, New Brunswick, NJ
Ph.D., Philosophy, Awarded May 2014
Dissertation: *On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality*
Committee: Ernest Sosa (chair), Alvin Goldman, Ruth Chang, Susanna Schellenberg, and Jonathan Dancy (external)
University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA
B.A., Philosophy, May 2008
Summa cum laude and with distinction in the major
Honors Thesis: *Laws of Nature and the Traditional Problem of Induction*
- PUBLICATIONS/
FORTHCOMING
- Books*
- The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason*, co-edited with Ruth Chang. (In final stages of preparation, to appear in 2020.)
- Articles and Book Sections*
- Forthcoming. “Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
- Forthcoming. “Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons.” *Philosophical Studies*.
- Forthcoming. “The Eclipse of Instrumental Reason” in Chang, R. and Sylvan, K. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason*.
- Forthcoming. “Reasons to Withhold, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat” (with Errol Lord) for Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) *Reasons, Justification, and Defeat*. Oxford University Press.
2020. “Responsibilism within Reason” for Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.) *Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches*. Cambridge University Press.
2020. “An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.” *Philosophical Review* 129(1): 1-51.

2020. “Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)” (with Errol Lord) in Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) *Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation*. London: Routledge.
2019. “Epistemic Consequentialism and its Aftermath.” *Analysis* 79(4): 773-783.
2019. “Reasons: Right, Wrong, Normative, Fundamental” (with Errol Lord). *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 15: 43-74.
2018. “Veritism Unswamped.” *Mind* 127: 381-435
2018. “Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 97: 190-222.
2018. “The Place of Reasons in Epistemology” in Star, D. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity* (with Ernest Sosa).
2017. “Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?” *Synthese* (Online First). DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1577-7.
2017. “Responsibilism out of Character” in Alfano, M. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) *Epistemic Situationism*. Oxford University Press.
2017. “Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons” in Ichikawa, J. (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism* (with Daniel Fogal).
2016. “Skorupski on Spontaneity, Apriority, and Normative Truth.” *Philosophical Quarterly* 66: 617-628.
2016. “The Illusion of Discretion.” *Synthese* 193: 1635-1665.
2016. “Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.” *Philosophy Compass* 11: 364-376.
2016. “Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.” *Philosophy Compass* 11: 377-389.
2015. “What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be.” *Philosophical Studies* 172: 587-606.
2012. “How to Be a Redundant Realist.” *Episteme* 9: 271-282.
2012. “Truth Monism without Teleology.” *Thought* 1: 161-169.

Work Under Contract or Recently Commissioned

(with Errol Lord) “On an Overreaction: Reasons for Suspension and Epistemic Dilemmas” for Hughes, N. (ed.) *Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas*. Oxford University Press.

(with Errol Lord) “Suspending Well” for Oliveira, L. and Silva, P. (eds.) *Propositional and Doxastic Justification*. Routledge.

“Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond)” for Lasonen-Aarnio, M. and Littlejohn, C. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Evidence*.

Entry on Foundationalism for *Oxford Bibliographies Online*.

Review of *Realisms Interlinked* by Arindam Chakrabarti for *Mind*.

Bibliographies

“Reasons in Epistemology” in *Oxford Bibliographies Online*. First version published online in early 2014. The entry is in the process of being updated in light of the large amount of new literature that emerged since early 2014.

Reviews

2019. *Knowing Better* by Daniel Star. *The Journal of Moral Philosophy* 16: 97–100.
2018. *The Logic of Commitment* by Gary Chartier. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.
2017. *Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue* eds. Fairweather, A. and Flanagan, O. *Analysis* 77: 663–667.
2016. *The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory* eds. Hirose, I. and J. Olson. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (with Errol Lord).

OTHER WORK
IN PROGRESS

“Non-Epistemic Perception as Mere Technology”
 “Knowledge and the Presentation of Reality”
Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality
A Non-Instrumental Theory of Practical Reason

SELECTED
TALKS

- “The Non-Instrumental Structure of Practical Reason”
University of Texas, Austin February 2020
- “Knowledge and the Presentation of Reality”
University of Warwick January 2020
- “Respect for the Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality”
University of Helsinki December 2019
- “From Conceptual to Doxastic Pragmatism?”
University of Zurich March 2019
- “Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons”
Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop March 2019
- “Respect for the Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality”
University of St. Andrews December 2018
- “Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond)”
New Directions in Virtue Epistemology, Glasgow September 2018
- “Knowledge and the Presentation of Reality”
Freiburg Normative Epistemology Workshop July 2018
Bloomsbury Epistemology Group March 2018
University of Stirling (Speaker Series) February 2018
- “An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism”
UNC Chapel Hill (Normativity Reading Group) September 2017
- “Can Performance Epistemology Explain Reflective Epistemic Value?”
Bled 2017: Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Skills June 2017
- “The Theaetetus Thesis”
Second Southampton-Leuven Epistemology Conference April 2017
- “Respect for the Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality”
Sole Keynote Speaker, Second Cologne-Leuven Epistemology Workshop May 2016
- “Reasons: Right, Wrong, Normative, Fundamental” (with Errol Lord)

<i>The Language and Metaphysics of Normativity, Uppsala</i>	May 2016
“Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation”	
<i>The Normativity of Attitudes, Saarbrücken</i>	December 2015
<i>2015 European Normativity Network Conference, Berlin</i>	November 2015
<i>Bled 2015: The Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind</i>	June 2015
“Against Full Aptness”	
<i>Symposium on Sosa’s Judgment and Agency, KU Leuven</i>	September 2015
“The Achievements of Reason: A Rationalist Virtue Epistemology”	
<i>Virtue Epistemology Conference, KU Leuven</i>	September 2015
“Reasons: Right, Wrong, Normative, Fundamental” (with Errol Lord)	
<i>St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality</i>	May 2015
“Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons”	
<i>Normativity of Rationality Conference, Cardiff University</i>	May 2015
“Explaining the Significance of the Internal in Epistemology”	
<i>University of California, San Diego</i>	January 2015
“How to Be an Epistemic Non-Consequentialist”	
<i>Second Southampton Normativity Workshop</i>	January 2015
“Rationality and Fundamental Epistemic Value: What’s the Connection?”	
<i>University of Graz</i>	June 2014
“Veritism, Epistemic Virtue, and Hurka’s Principle”	
<i>NYU Value and Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology Conference</i>	May 2014
“The Objective Significance of the Subjective”	
<i>University of Pennsylvania (Epistemic Normativity Graduate Seminar)</i>	April 2014
“Reasons: Right, Wrong, Normative, Fundamental”	
<i>Southern Normativity Conference, University of Kent</i>	March 2014
“Apparent Reasons and the Fragmentation of Epistemic Evaluation”	
<i>Harvard University</i>	January 2014
“Rationality and Justification: Reasons to Divorce?”	
<i>University of Edinburgh (Early Career Forum, Research Talk)</i>	November 2013
“Why Be Rational?”	
<i>University of Edinburgh (Early Career Forum, Public Talk)</i>	November 2013
“How to Divorce Rationality and Justification in Epistemology”	
<i>University of Southampton</i>	October 2013
“The Place of Reasons in Epistemology”	
<i>St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality</i>	May 2013
“Reasons and the Metaphysics of Epistemology”	
<i>Northwestern–Notre Dame Epistemology Conference</i>	April 2013
<i>Georgetown Reasons and Reasoning Conference</i>	April 2013

	“On How Groups Possess Evidence” <i>Princeton-Rutgers-Penn Social Epistemology Workshop</i>	April 2013
	“What Isn’t the Swamping Problem?” <i>USC-UCLA Graduate Conference</i>	February 2013
COMMENTS	On Chris Blake Turner’s ‘What Basing Must Be’ <i>Eastern APA</i> (Delivered from Abroad Thanks to the Home Office)	January 2019
	On Ernest Sosa’s <i>Epistemic Explanations</i> <i>COGITO Symposium, University of Glasgow</i>	September 2018
	On Peter Klein’s “Certain Knowledge from Fallible Foundations” <i>Episteme Conference, Tenerife, Canary Islands</i>	July 2018
	On Jonathan Ichikawa’s <i>Contextualizing Knowledge</i> <i>Pacific APA</i>	March 2018
	On Daniel Greco’s “On the Very Idea of an Epistemic Dilemma” <i>Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference</i>	August 2017
	On Elizabeth Harman’s “When Is a Failure to Realize Exculpatory?” <i>Responsibility—The Epistemic Dimension II, Amsterdam</i>	May 2015
	On Juan Comesaña’s “Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?” <i>SOFIA Conference, Huatulco, Mexico</i>	January 2015
	On Maria Alvarez’s “Reasons for Action as Reasons for Belief” <i>First Southampton Normativity Workshop</i>	June 2014
	On Ryan Walsh’s “A Hard Problem for Schroeder’s Analysis of Knowledge” <i>Pacific APA</i>	April 2014
	On Daniel Fogal’s “Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure” <i>Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Conference</i>	April 2013
	On Mark Phelan’s “Believing <i>Qua</i> Member” <i>Pacific APA</i>	March 2013
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Instructor (at Southampton)	
	Classical Indian Philosophy (co-taught with Chris Janaway)	Fall 2019
	Graduate Seminar on the Metaphysics of Knowledge	Fall 2019
	Epistemology	Fall 2019, 2018 and 2017, Spring 2017 and 2015
	Moral Philosophy	Spring 2014, Fall 2014, Spring 2019
	The Ethics of Belief	Spring 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019
	Knowledge and Mind (Small Group Tutorials)	Fall 2018, Spring 2019
	Scepticism	Fall 2018
	Ethics	Spring 2018
	Graduate Seminar on the Epistemology of Perception	Fall 2017
	Philosophy of Mind	Fall 2015
	Reasons, Rationality, and Ethics	Fall 2014
	Political Philosophy	Fall 2015
	Ethics (Small Group Tutorials)	Fall 2014, Spring 2016, Spring 2018, Fall 2018

Advisor (at Southampton)	
Countless undergraduate dissertations	Ongoing since 2014
MA students (Sam Jones, Jack Maden, David Field, Charlotte Bonar, Josef Nickerson, Kirsty Bishop)	2014, 2016, 2018, 2019
Visiting PhD student (Julen Ibarrondo Murguialday)	Spring 2019
Instructor (at Rutgers)	
Introduction to Epistemology	Summer 2013
Aesthetics of Film	Summer 2012
Introduction to Metaphysics	Summer 2011
Teaching Assistant (at Rutgers)	
Introduction to Philosophy (for James Simmons)	Spring 2011
Current Moral and Social Issues (for Jeff McMahan)	Fall 2010

SERVICE

Major Administrative Roles	
Director of Undergraduate Admissions	Since Summer 2017
Interim Director of Graduate Studies	Spring and Summer 2017
Dissertation Coordinator	2014-16
External Examiner	
M. Phil Theses of Claire Field and Thomas Byrne at KCL	Fall 2015, Fall 2016
Editorial	
Editorial Assistant for the following books by Ernest Sosa: <i>Judgment and Agency</i> , Oxford University Press, 2015 <i>Epistemology</i> , Princeton University Press, 2017	2014-15
Editorial Manager for <i>PPR</i> , <i>Noûs</i> , and <i>Philosophical Issues</i>	2013-14
Editorial Assistant for <i>PPR</i> , <i>Noûs</i> , and <i>Philosophical Issues</i>	2011-12
Editor of the following PhilPapers categories: Infinetism The Speckled Hen Problem	Since 2015
Assistant Editor of the following PhilPapers categories: Perception and Skepticism; Perceptual Knowledge; Perceptual Evidence	Since 2013
Referee for Presses and Journals	Since 2012
Oxford University Press, Routledge, <i>Philosophical Review</i> , <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> , <i>Mind</i> , <i>Noûs</i> , <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i> , <i>Analysis</i> , <i>Analytic Philosophy</i> , <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i> , <i>Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i> , <i>Dialectica</i> , <i>Dialogue</i> , <i>Episteme</i> , <i>Ergo</i> , <i>Erkenntnis</i> , <i>Ethical Theory and Moral Practice</i> , <i>Inquiry</i> , <i>Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> , <i>Journal of the American Philosophical Association</i> , <i>Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy</i> , <i>Journal of Moral Philosophy</i> , <i>Journal of Value Inquiry</i> , <i>Organon F</i> , <i>Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</i> , <i>Philosophical Explorations</i> , <i>Philosophers' Imprint</i> , <i>Philosophical Quarterly</i> , <i>Ratio</i> , <i>Synthese</i> , <i>Teorema</i> , <i>Thought</i>	
Referee for Conferences	Since 2009
British Society for Ethical Theory, Canadian Philosophical Association, Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Conference, Southampton-Humboldt Normativity Conference, St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference	
Referee for Funding Bodies	Since 2017
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada	
Organizer	
The Epistemic Role of Simple Seeing Workshop, Southampton	2017
Epistemology and Normativity Workshop, Rutgers	2012
Research Circle on Epistemic Value, Rutgers	2011
Research Circle on Rationality, Coherence and Normativity, Rutgers	2010
Research Circle on the Epistemology of Perception, Rutgers	2010
Co-Organizer	

Knowing by Looking Workshop, Southampton	2016
Attitudes and Agency: Epistemology Workshop, Southampton	2016
Three Workshops on Social and Cultural Ontology, Southampton	2015-6
Value and Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology, NYU	2014
Rutgers philosophy department colloquium series	2013
Rutgers graduate student colloquium series	2012
Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Conference	2011
Public Outreach	
Talk Entitled 'Can Ideas Have Authors?' at a Da Vinci Exhibition	March 2019
Talk on Perception at Southampton City Art Gallery	February 2017
Talk on Studying Philosophy at Farnborough Sixth Form College	July 2015
Talks at Southampton Sixth Form Conference	April 2014, July 2014, July 2016
Climate	
Volunteer in mentoring program at Rutgers for undergraduate women and minorities in philosophy	2011-12
Other Administrative Roles	
Member of internationalization committee	2014-15
Manager of departmental website	2014-15

GRADUATE	Epistemology	
COURSEWORK	Proseminar (in Epistemology and Mind) with Alvin Goldman	Fall 2008
(GPA: 4.0/4.0)	Knowing How with Jason Stanley	Spring 2009
'*' = AUDITED	Methodological Naturalism and Intuitions with Alvin Goldman	Fall 2009
	Social Epistemology with Alvin Goldman	Spring 2010
	Survey in Epistemology with Ernest Sosa	Spring 2010
	*Pragmatic Encroachment with Jason Stanley	Spring 2010
	Independent Study on Epistemic Rationality with Alvin Goldman	Spring 2010
	Independent Study on Epistemology of Perception with Ernest Sosa	Spring 2010
	*Skepticism with Brian Weatherson	Fall 2010
	Ancient Skepticism with Robert Bolton	Fall 2010
	Independent Study on Epistemic Value with Ernest Sosa	Spring 2011
	*Knowledge First with Jason Stanley	Fall 2012
	Ethics	
	Reasons for Action with Ruth Chang and Derek Parfit	Spring 2009
	Survey in Ethical Theory with Holly Smith	Spring 2010
	Independent Study on Requirements of Rationality with Ruth Chang	Spring 2010
	Advanced Topics in Ethics with Jeff McMahan and Derek Parfit	Spring 2011
	Independent Study on Reasons and Value with Ruth Chang	Spring 2011
	Mind	
	Proseminar (in Epistemology and Mind) with Alvin Goldman	Fall 2008
	Philosophy of Mind with Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn	Fall 2009
	Proseminar in Cognitive Science with Zenon Pylyshyn	Fall 2009
	Graduate Survey in Philosophy of Mind with Carrie Figdor (Iowa)	Fall 2007
	Intentionality with Francesco Orilia (Iowa)	Spring 2006
	Metaphysics and Language	
	Fundamentality and Metaphysics with Ted Sider (NYU)	Spring 2009
	The Metaphysics of Propositions with Jeff King	Fall 2008
	Vagueness with Brian McLaughlin	Spring 2009
	Other	
	Hume with Martha Bolton	Fall 2008
	Probability with Barry Loewer	Fall 2008
	Non-Classical Logics with Brian Weatherson	Fall 2009
	Dissertation Seminar with Jason Stanley	Spring 2013

SUMMER
SCHOOL

The Normativity of Epistemic Rationality, University of Cologne

Summer 2011

REFERENCES

Ernest Sosa

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Rutgers University, New Brunswick

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