Meets Tuesdays in 65/1173 from 1-3pm and Thursdays in 65/2115 from 2-3pm SCHEDULE OF READINGS
For each week, the readings mainly divide into required and optional further readings. I include the optional readings just in case you find the topic especially interesting and would like to write a paper on it or simply learn more.
Part 1. Introduction
Week 1 – The Possibility and Nature of the Ethics of Belief
Required Reading There is none for this week. But see Blackboard for notes and slides.
Part 2. The Normative Ethics of Belief
Week 2 – Evidentialism vs. Pragmatism
Required Reading Rinard, Susanna. “Against the New Evidentialists.” LINK Shah, Nishi. "A New Argument for Evidentialism." LINK
Optional Further Reading Clifford, William K. “The Ethics of Belief.” LINK James, William. “The Will to Believe.” LINK Leary, Stephanie. "In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.” LINK McHugh, Conor. “The Illusion of Exclusivity.” LINK Nolfi, Kate. “Why Evidence (and Only Evidence) Can Justify Belief.” LINK
Week 3 – Pragmatic Encroachment
Required Reading Brown, Jessica. “Knowledge and Practical Reason.” LINK Strongly Recommended Reading Stanley, Jason and Hawthorne, John. “Knowledge and Action.” LINK
Optional Further Reading Brown, Jessica. “Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.” LINK Brown, Jessica. “Practical Reasoning, Decision Theory, and Anti-Intellectualism.” LINK Brown, Jessica. “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.” LINK Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.” LINK Hawthorne, John. Selections from Knowledge and Lotteries. LINK Lackey, Jennifer. “Acting on Knowledge.” LINK Stanley, Jason. Selections from Knowledge and Practical Interests. LINK
Week 4 – Permissivism vs. Impermissivism
Required Reading Schoenfield, Miriam. “Permission to Believe.” LINK
Strongly Recommended Reading Cohen, Gerald Allan. “Paradoxes of Conviction.” LINK
Optional Further Reading Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” LINK Kelly, Thomas. “Evidence Can Be Permissive.” LINK Sylvan, Kurt. “Illusion of Discretion.” LINK Vavova, Ekaterina. “Irrelevant Influences.” LINK White, Roger. “Epistemic Permissiveness.” LINK
Week 5 – Epistemic Kantianism vs. Epistemic Consequentialism
Required Reading Sylvan, K. "An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism." LINK
Optional Further Reading Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, Geoffrey. “A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism.” LINK Berker, Selim. “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.” LINK Berker, Selim. "The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism." LINK Firth, Roderick. “Epistemic Merit: Intrinsic and Instrumental.” LINK Fumerton, Richard. “Epistemic Normativity and Justification.” LINK Sylvan, Kurt. “Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.” LINK Sylvan, Kurt. “Veritism Unswamped.” LINK
3. The Applied Ethics of Belief
Week 6 – Optimistic and Pessimistic Doxastic Attitudes
Required Prescott, P. "What Pessimism Is." LINK Preston-Roedder, R. "Faith in Humanity." LINK
Strongly Recommended though Indirectly Relevant Material Marusic, B. Evidence and Agency, chs. 1 and 5-7. LINK
Optional Further Reading Alston, W. "The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition." LINK Dienstag, J. "The Anatomy of Pessimism" in Pessimism. LINK Harris, G. "Pessimism." LINK Schopenhauer, A. "On the Sufferings of the World." LINK Schopenhauer, A. "On the Vanity of Existence." LINK
Podcast and Text Interview Interview with Stephen Pinker on The Ezra Klein Show: MP3. There is also a separate text interview with Pinker here.
Week 7 – Epistemic Injustice
Required Reading Fricker, Miranda. Selections from Epistemic Injustice. LINK
Strongly Recommended Reading Fricker, Miranda. Further Selections from Epistemic Injustice. LINK Optional Further Reading Anderson, Elizabeth. “Epistemic Injustice as a Virtue of Social Institutions.” LINK Dotson, Kristie. "Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression." LINK Fricker, Miranda. “Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege.” LINK Gendler, Tamar Szabo. “The Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias.” LINK Pohlhaus, Gaile. “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice.” LINK Gougen, Stacey. “Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality.” LINK
Week 8 – Ideology
Required Reading Shelby, Tommie. “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory.” LINK Stanley, Jason. Selection from How Propaganda Works. LINK
Optional Further Reading Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” LINK Elster, John. "Belief, Bias, and Ideology." LINK Geuss, Raymond. "Ideology." LINK Haslanger, Sally. “Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements.” LINK Haslanger, Sally. "Ideology Beyond Belief." LINK Lippmann, Walter. Selections from Public Opinion. LINK Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. Selections from The German Ideology. LINK Rosen, Michael. "The Forms of False Consciousness." LINK Srinivasan, A. "Philosophy and Ideology." LINK Stanley, Jason. Further selections from How Propaganda Works. LINK-1, LINK-2
Week 9 – Knowledge and Trust in Epistemic Authorities
Required Reading Zagzebski, L. Selections from Epistemic Authority. LINK-1, LINK-2
Strongly Recommended Reading Zagzebski, L. Further Selection from Epistemic Authority. LINK Fricker, E. 'Second-Hand Knowledge.' LINK
Optional Further Reading Holton, R. ‘Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe’ LINK Jones, K. ‘Trustworthiness’ LINK McLeod, C. ‘Trust’ LINK Wanderer, J. and Townsend, L. ‘Is it Rational to Trust?’ LINK Zagzebski, L. Yet Further Selections from Epistemic Authority. LINK-1, LINK-2 4. The Meta-Ethics of Belief
Week 10 – Doxastic Involuntarism and Doxastic Compatibilism
Required Alston, W. “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification” LINK Hieronymi, P. “Responsibility for Believing” LINK
Strongly Recommended Reading Hieronymi, P. “Controlling Attitudes” LINK Ryan, S. “Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief” LINK
Optional Further Reading Feldman, R. “The Ethics of Belief” LINK McHugh, C. “Exercising Doxastic Freedom” LINK McHugh, C. “Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness” LINK Peels, R. “Against Doxastic Compatibilism” LINK Steup, M. “Doxastic Freedom” LINK Steup, M. “Belief, Voluntariness, and Intentionality” LINK
Week 11 – The Source of Doxastic Norms
Required Reading Velleman, J. David. "On The Aim of Belief." LINK
Optional Further Reading Enoch, David. “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action.” LINK McHugh, Conor. “Belief and Aims.” LINK Owens, David. “Does Belief Have an Aim?” LINK Railton, Peter. “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Action and Belief.” LINK Railton, Peter. “Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief.” LINK Shah, Nishi. “How Truth Governs Belief.” LINK