0.  Overview.  As I say on the home page, my main areas of interest are epistemology, practical reason, value theory and philosophy of mind.  But the emphasis is by far on epistemology.  I'm mainly interested in these other areas because of the fruitful analogies they afford or because working on problems in them sheds interesting light on problems in epistemology.  I am a fan of importing distinctions into epistemology that have often been drawn more clearly in the practical literature.  Moreover, some topics in epistemology simply cannot be addressed capably without some serious knowledge of these areas -- and I here have in mind the areas other than philosophy of mind, which most would agree is obviously relevant to epistemology.  This is particularly true of many issues about epistemic value  which greatly interest me.  But it is also true, I more controversially think, of older issues, such as various internalism/externalism disputes.  
              Below, I've listed some of my topical interests in some of these areas; some distinctions more familiar from the practical literature are presupposed by how I've framed a number of these topics.  
                   (Soon, I shall add a page with works in progress, as well as a summary of my dissertation project; stay posted!)
1.  Epistemology.  Some headings under  which my research falls:

* Explaining the normative impact of higher-order evidence and beliefs about one's belief-forming processes and methods.
* Explaining how epistemic rationality could be genuinely normative if it could (as I think it does) require us to refrain from using reliable methods and to adopt unreliable methods.
* Explaining how true belief could be the only intrinsic epistemic value (if not the only final epistemic value).
* Understanding the relationship between epistemic value and objective epistemic norms, and figuring out precisely how non-teleological objective epistemic norms might be.
* The relationship (if any) between epistemic rationality and doxastic justification (I do think they're quite distinct!).
* The relationship (if any) between epistemic responsibility and what we have objective epistemic reason to believe.
* Whether all justified beliefs are justified partly in virtue of being based on reasons.
* Seeing whether there is one fundamental epistemic norm that explains all the others, or whether we must be pluralists.
* Seeing whether there is any deep incomparability in epistemology (between reasons, values, or requirements).
* Basic beliefs and belief-independent processes.
* Various internalism/externalism disputes.
* The role of experience in foundational justification.
2.  Practical reason, metaethics and value theory.  A number of my primary interests also fall in the philosophy of practical reason, metaethics and value theory.  Here are some headings for my work:

* Requirements of coherence, their form, and whether they are robustly normative.
* Relations between the deontic and the evaluative, and the status of "buckpassing" accounts of value.
* Whether facts about what we objectively ought to do are ever explained by beliefs or evidence.
* The relationship between an agent's local appraisability for acting rightly or wrongly and her beliefs and evidence.
* Whether facts about an agent's local appraisability for forming attitudes rightly or wrongly can be explained by deontic constraints on attitudes. 
* How similar or dissimilar practical and theoretical reasoning might be.
* How similar or dissimilar practical and theoretical normativity might be.

3.  Philosophy of mind and action.  The strength of my interests in the philosophies of mind and action is roughly on par with that of my interests in practical reason, metaethics and value theory.  Once again, here are headings under which my work falls:
 
* Contents of perception.
* Relations between character, content and justification.
* Concepts.
* Functionalism and normativism about the attitudes.
* Inferentialism about logical concept identity and possession.
* Representational theory of mind vs. Rylean/pragmatist pictures.
* Cognitivism about intention; whether something like Velleman's cognitivism might be right.
* Whether cognitive attitudes strictly weaker than belief (e.g., acceptance in Crispin Wright's sense) could  (often or always) be enough for the purposes of psychological explanation.
*  Knowing how, and intellectualism vs. anti-intellectualism about it.
*  The nature of autonomy, how it relates to and contrasts with voluntariness, and whether/how the notion generalizes to apply to attitudes rather than just actions.